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INTRODUCTION 
This study was designed to examine several methods and 
markets Iowa producers have available to market their hogs. 
A comparison was made of the returns producers receive using 
several different methods and markets. Since there are both 
different methods and markets available to Iowa producers, it 
might be helpful to trace the development of hog marketing 
both in Iowa and the United States. 
Production and marketing of hogs is a major farm enter­
prise in Iowa, In 1963, Iowa farmers marketed more than 19.7 
million head of hogs (51). Gash receipts received by Iowa 
producers from hogs in 1963 accounted for 26.Ô percent of 
their total cash receipts (50). Therefore, a study which may 
improve the methods of marketing hogs would be important to 
Iowa hog producers, even small gains in hog marketing ef­
ficiency could contribute substantially to farm income. 
History of Hog Marketing 
Hog marketing in the United States and particularly in 
Iowa has undergone many changes since hogs began to contribute 
substantially to agriculture income. During the early devel­
opment of our country, the marketing of hogs and all agri­
culture products was a relatively simple operation. A large 
proportion of the hogs that were produced were consumed on 
the farm by the producer, even at this early stage of our 
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country's development certain portions of the hog were cured 
and shipped to more distant consumption areas. Those hogs 
that were not consumed at the farm were slaughtered in and 
for the local community, but the number slaughtered off the 
farms were extremely limited. 
As the railroads began extending Westward, in about 
1#50; they were used quite extensively for shipment of live 
hogs from surplus production areas to deficit production 
areas (47). A short time later, about 1070, refrigerated 
railroad cars were developed, this made it possible to ship 
meat instead of only live animals. These developments con­
tributed to the growth of a national meat market, as con­
trasted to the limited local markets prior to that time. 
With the development of a national market, pork pro­
duction in the more Western states, particularly the Corn 
Belt, began to increase rapidly. In lâ50, only three coun­
ties in Iowa had over $0 hogs per square mile (4). In 1962, 
there were only 1Ô counties with less than $0 hogs per 100 
acres of cropland and 37 counties with more than 75 hogs per 
100 acres of cropland. 
The increase in hog production led to the development 
of more complex marketing systems. The marketing systems 
were more complex systems than those employed when only local 
markets were involved. Since most of the hogs during the 
early development of a national market had to move by rail, 
packing plants located near or at the rail centers. The 
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location of many packing plants at rail centers caused some 
unique methods of marketing livestock, these were the terminal 
markets. About IÔ50, terminal markets began to evolve as the 
primary method of marketing hogs, cattle, and sheep. The 
terminal markets, with their established yard facilities, 
made it possible to concentrate hogs from many outlying pro­
duction areas. The first terminal yards were owned by the 
railroads. Later these terminal facilities were purchased 
jointly by the major packing companies and made an integral 
part of packing plant operations. They kept control of these 
facilities until the Packers* Consent Decree of 1920 which 
forced the packing companies to divest of their interest in 
the stockyard companies (4). 
Chicago, at this time, was the largest meat packing 
center in the United States, Chicago's prominence in the meat 
packing industry was primarily due to location, located at a 
major railroad center and located geographically between the 
Midwest hog producing area and the consumption centers of the 
East. 
Later, as hog production moved Westward, other terminal 
yards were developed at St, Paul, Omaha, Kansas City, St, 
Joseph, St, Louis, and Sioux City. These new centers of 
livestock concentration made it more convenient for producers 
in the more Western areas to market hogs. 
During the early period of national markets, terminal 
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yards or markets provided a worthwhile function of concen­
trating both the buyers (packing plants) and sellers of hogs 
at a given location. The hogs after being concentrated and 
marketed were slaughtered in nearby packing plants and finally 
the meat was shipped East to the deficit producing areas which 
were the main consuming centers. 
The freight rates, during the early history of national 
markets, made it economically feasible to ship meat, rather 
than livestock, east to the consuming centers. The decline 
of the packing industry in the primary consumption centers 
was caused by the freight changes which favored the shipment 
of carcasses rather than live animals. 
it was more economical to slaughter the hogs in the pro­
duction centers and ship only carcasses or wholesale cuts 
to the consumption centers for distribution. 
About 1889 freight rates changed, again making it 
profitable to ship live animals east for slaughtering. But 
the freight change was only temporary and by 1890 it was 
again more economical to slaughter livestock in the produc­
tion areas and ship the meat east. There have been many 
fluctuations in freight rates since 1890, however, the 
direction of freight rate changes generally has favored ship­
ment of meat to the consuming centers rather than shipment of 
live animals to slaughtering plants located in consuming . 
centers. 
About 1890, independent packers located in interior Iowa 
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began to enlarge their packing plants. The freight rate ad­
vantage and lower procurement costs speeded the development 
of interior Iowa "packing plants. The rapid growth of in­
terior packing plants in Iowa attracted the attention of the 
national packers. They became interested in setting up 
packing plants in interior Iowa to compete with these new 
plants. Traditionally, the national packers had built their 
plants at the terminal market centers. The growth of the 
interior located packing plants caused different hog market­
ing patterns to develop. Previously, most Iowa hogs were 
marketed through terminal yards, now they began to move in 
much greater proportions direct to packing plants. 
Interior Marketing of Hogs Increases 
Some of the advantages that interior plants had over 
terminal based plants were: (1) the freight rate advantage 
of shipping carcasses rather than live animals, (2) the labor 
and other plant costs were slightly lower outside large 
metropolitan centers, and (3) the hog procurement costs were 
lower. The interior packers located their plants in con­
centrated hog production areas. 
Hog producers were attracted to marketing at interior 
plants because it reduced transportation costs, shrinkage 
loss and marketing costs. 
A portion of the reduction in marketing cost was offset 
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by lower hog prices but not enough to discourage the shift to 
direct marketing. 
The typical hog producer, during this period, had only 
a small number of sows and farrowed only once or twice a year. 
Therefore, most producers had insufficient numbers of 
slaughter hogs ready to market at one time. However, with 
the advent of direct marketing, a producer could top out his 
hogs as they became ready for market. He could reduce his 
transportation cost by combining hog marketing with a normal 
shopping trip to town. The cost of transporting hogs to 
market, in this case, would be extremely small. 
Table 1 shows that the proportion of hogs going to ter­
minals has declined while those going direct to plants has 
increased. 
Table 1, Destination of slaughter hogs in Iowa 
Tear* 
Public 
yards 
U )  
Direct to 
Packing plants 
or dealers 
li) 
Other 
methods 
li) Source 
1920 67.4 19.7 12.2 4 
1925 62.7 27.3 10.0 4 
1930 38.6 39.4 22.0 4 
1933 30,0 65.0 5.0 47 
1940 20.2 56.7 23.1 7 
1954 14.4 83.0 2.6 24 
D^ata not available for years other than those listed. 
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The expansion of meat of independent meat facilities in 
interior Iowa caused reduction in number of hogs shipped to 
terminal markets, A reduction in flow of hogs to terminal 
markets also reduced the flow of hogs to terminal based 
packing plants. To counteract the decreased slaughtering at 
their terminal based plants, national packers, who had tra­
ditionally dominated the meat packing business, began to 
both build and purchase packing plants in interior Iowa and 
southern Minnesota, 
The increased numbers of interior located packing plants 
caused an increase in the proportion of hogs marketed direct 
to packing plants. 
The growth of direct marketing and the bypassing of 
terminal markets added more complexities to the job of 
marketing hogs. After this change, a producer was no longer 
assured that all competitors, for his hogs, would be located 
at the same market. Before direct marketing became a sig­
nificant factor in the market, terminal markets were the 
primary price registering point for live hogs. Hence, prices 
reported by central markets gave producers sufficient infor­
mation to determine when or where they should market their 
hogs. But hog marketing became more complex when many more 
outlets were available. The producer, in order to assure 
himself of an equitable price for his hogs, had to personally 
contact packing plants, packer buyers buying stations, and 
a 
others before marketing his hogs. He also had to study and 
keep current on the terminal markets to keep abreast of the 
total price picture. 
In an attempt to collect some of this new price infor­
mation, the U. S. Department of Agriculture Crop and Live­
stock Reporting Service began in 1931 to gather data from 
the interior Iowa and southern Minnesota packing plants. 
However, these data were less reliable than the original 
terminal market data. The terminal market prices were re­
corded by unbiased U. 3. Department of Agriculture reporters 
while the interior reports were based on a packer employees 
estimation of the day's prices. 
Another factor which complicated hog marketing as direct 
marketing enlarged was that many packing plants introduced 
new methods of evaluating hogs. One of these new methods was 
evaluating each hog on a basis of grade and weight of a 
particular hog. The producers were then paid on the total 
evaluation of each hog. The general method used previously, 
both at terminal markets and packing plants, was to buy an 
entire lot on a one price basis, this was called buying on a 
mixed basis. 
The increased numbers of prices, since the grades were 
not comparable in all cases, required a much more complex 
reporting system than the one in use. It was practically 
impossible to report all these prices on the radio or in the 
newspapers. 
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Another method introduced by some packing plants about 
1950 was carcass yield and grade, thus adding further to the 
choice of selling methods. Hogs purchased by carcass grade 
and yield method were not evaluated live. They were evaluated 
only after the hogs were slaughtered and hung in the cooler. 
Carcass grade and yield buying also decreased the value of 
live price quotations and required the producer to analyze 
more factors before selling his hogs. 
To increase the marketing complexity even more, new 
packing plants are continually being established in the main 
hog producing areas, hence more markets available to pro­
ducers. These new plants increase the number of outlets 
available to Iowa producers, but do not help clarify the price 
structure of the market. 
The following chapter will specify the types of markets, 
the major methods of marketing and some of the features of 
each. 
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TYPES OF MARKET OUTLETS AND METHODS OF MARKETING HOGS 
Types of Outlets 
Terminal market 
There are about eight terminal markets located within 
reasonable distances to be available to some Iowa hog pro­
ducers, They are Sioux City, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota; St, Joseph, Missouri; Kansas City, 
Missouri; St. Louis, Missouri; St. Paul, Minnesota; and 
Chicago, Illinois, Not all farmers in Iowa have alternatives 
to each of these markets but each market is within a reason­
able hauling distance to a portion of Iowa's producers. 
Terminal markets are those markets which offer hog pro­
ducers specialized selling services. The terminal markets 
are organized into two separate entities — the stockyard 
company and the commission firms or exchange division. The 
stockyard company owns the yard and facilities, they rent 
these facilities to individual commission firms. It is the 
commission firm's responsibility to sell livestock for the 
farmer customers. Livestock sent to the terminal yards are 
consigned to the commission firm which, in turn, sells them 
to the various livestock buyers. However, livestock can be 
sold by the producer himself if he chooses. Most hogs sold 
through terminal markets are sold to packing plants for 
slaughter. It is the commission company's responsibility to 
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to obtain the highest price possible for each particular 
producer's hogs. The stockyard company, in most cases, 
handles the feeding and care of the animals. This cost is 
either charged to the commission firm or the producer con­
signee. 
Hogs sold through the terminal are received at the yards, 
consigned to a commission firm and then unloaded and driven 
into pens assigned to that commission firm. Hogs are given 
feed and water if held over night or were hauled a long dis­
tance. If the hogs arrive too late for a particular day's 
sale, the hogs are held over and sold the next morning. 
Immediately after the sale price has been established, the 
hogs are weighed to estimate the return due the producer. 
Ideally, hogs of a particular shipment, that consists of 
varying grades, should be sorted into various grades before 
selling. That is, hogs should be graded so different prices 
could be determined for each different grade in the shipment. 
Actually, this is seldom done. Usually, a price is placed on 
the total lot. A producer generally receives only an average 
price for the entire lot of hogs. However, if there are some 
animals which are extremely different from the rest of the 
lot, these hogs are priced separately. 
Farmers selling on the terminal market must adjust their 
gross returns by the cost of using this type of selling 
service. If producers desire specialists to sell their hogs. 
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then they must be willing to pay for the price of this service. 
The cost of marketing hogs at a terminal yard includes: 
1. The cost of transporting the hogs to market, which 
includes insurance during transit. 
2. Gross return should be adjusted by the loss in 
weight during transit, loss that is in excess of 
what might be regained from feeding and watering 
at the market before sale. 
3. Yardage fee is charged for handling the feeding 
and handling of the livestock at the market. 
4. Commission charge, this is cost charged by com­
mission firm for the service of selling the hogs. 
5. Miscellaneous fees, yard inspection, meat board, 
etc. 
As mentioned earlier, hogs sold through the central ter­
minal markets are usually sold on a mixed basis, that is, an 
average price is computed for a shipment of hogs. There is 
a minimal of sorting done presently at most terminal markets. 
Most Iowa farmers are located farther from terminal markets 
than they are from their local markets, therefore, trans­
portation costs to terminal markets are usually higher. 
Before a producer can compare local market prices with 
terminal markets, the terminal market value must be adjusted 
downward by the additional amount of marketing charges which 
may be incurred. 
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Packing plants and packer buyer stations 
Farmers can sell their livestock direct to many packing 
plants located in Iowa, There are about 35 to 40 packing 
plants of varying sizes buying hogs in Iowa, In addition to 
packing plants themselves, many of the larger packing com­
panies have set up packer buying stations throughout the 
country. A buying station, operated by packer personnel, can 
usually buy hogs on the same basis as they are purchased 
directly by the plant. Most of the major packing plants in 
the state offer producers three different methods of selling 
their hogs. The producer must choose the method he desires 
to use selling his hogs. The following is a list of those 
methods and brief discussion of what they involve. 
1. Mixed. This method of buying is very similar to 
most terminal market selling. An average price is 
determined for the entire lot of hogs, with no 
differentiation in price between the various grades 
contained in the lot of hogs. Sometimes, extremely 
poor quality hogs are priced separately under this 
method, but usually, there is only one price re­
corded, 
2, Live sort. Using this method, the hogs of a lot 
are divided into categories similar to U. S. grades 
of No. 1 and No. 2 and No, 3, although individual 
packing plants may label them differently. Most 
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packing plant grades are fairly comparable to the 
U. S, Department of Agriculture grades. The hogs 
in each grade and weight category are priced 
separately. Producers can telephone packing plants 
before shipment to obtain the prices paid for each 
grade and weight on that particular day. Even 
though live grading may appear to be a more exact 
method of buying, in actual practice buyers often 
do no more grading under this method than they do 
when they are buying on a mixed basis. 
3. Carcass grade and yield. This method, as stated 
earlier, evaluates the animal after it is slaughtered 
and the carcass is hanging in the cooler. Some 
packing plants apply a 2 percent shrink on these 
carcasses before estimating their value. Other 
plants allow carcasses to cool slightly then weigh 
and apply a 1 percent shrink before arriving at the 
pay carcass wei^ t. The yield of meat is estimated 
and then multiplied by the wholesale value of the 
meat, then they subtract slaughtering costs and add 
the by-product value to arrive at a net value for 
the carcass. The yields of meat from a particular 
carcass are estimated by past experience with car­
cass evaluation of hogs of similar weight and grade. 
One disadvantage of this method is that any 
15 
loss due to disease is most often absorbed by the 
producer. The producer is paid only on the amount 
of saleable meat obtained from his hogs. 
A producer has a choice of delivering his hogs direct to 
the packing plant or to a packer buying station. Buying 
stations generally are located closer to the farm, thereby 
reducing both transportation costs and shrink loss. 
There is an additional feature many packing plants offer 
to producers. Many packing plants pay bonuses for hogs 
shipped from producers that are located outside their im­
mediate area. Packers indicate that higher prices for more 
distantly shipped is based on the fact that these hogs have 
lost more fill than those shipped only short distances. Many 
packers have clearly defined pricing areas. 
When a producer delivers hogs to a buying station, the 
hogs are weighed at that buying station rather than at the 
packing plant. The packing plant absorbs the shrink and 
transportation cost from the buying station to the packing 
plant. However, there is very little tissue shrink during 
short hauls, so the actual cost of this service relatively 
small to the packer. 
Concentration vards 
Another type of market outlet for hogs is cooperative 
dealers who buy hogs from farmers. The cooperative sells the 
hogs to the packing plants where they can get the highest 
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return. A cooperative concentration yard collects hogs in 
one location, sorts and selects the hogs according to weight 
and grade. After sorting, the best market outlet is 
selected, A farmer frequently does not have enough volume to 
sort himself but it is profitable with large numbers of hogs. 
Cooperative firms after selling hogs, divide any net profit 
made from sorting among the members of the cooperative on a 
patronage basis. 
Private dealers 
Private dealers operate in almost the same fashion as 
cooperative concentration yards, the only difference being 
that the net profit, if any, is retained by the dealer rather 
than paid to the producer. Most hogs purchased by dealers 
are purchased on a one price bid for all the hogs of a given 
shipment. Some private dealers have agreements with packing 
companies where a packing company will take the hogs at a 
set fee, or the dealer may be a free agent, simply selling 
hogs to the best market outlet available. 
Auctions 
Very few slaughter hogs are sold through auctions, so 
no discussion of this method of selling livestock will be 
included. 
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Methods of Marketing 
Producers must not only decide what method they will use 
to market their hogs. First, he must decide if he is to 
sell to a packer buyer, buying station operator, terminal 
market utilizing the services of a commission man, to a co­
operative concentration yard or to a private dealer. But 
after selecting a given market or while selecting a market, 
the producer must decide how he should sell them, mixed, 
live sort, or carcass grade and yield. Most marketing 
specialists have contended that any one given method may be 
more profitable than the others at given times or with a 
given type of hog. 
The producer is faced with making the above choices. 
What factors do producers have available to them that might 
aid in making the correct choice? The following factors can 
be used to assist the producer in making his choice of method 
and market. 
1. The shorter the distance to market, the lower the 
transportation cost will be and the lower shrinkage 
enroute to market. 
2. When selling to private dealers, packer buyers or 
to concentration yards, a producer can receive a 
specific price for his hogs, if they meet the 
specified standard. The producer can, if he con­
tacts the market beforehand, know the price before 
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his hogs leave the farm. But if he sells through 
a terminal market, he must accept the going price 
for that day and he does not know beforehand exactly 
what it will be, 
3, A producer selling through a cooperative concen­
tration yard may receive an additional bonus if the 
concentration yard operator is successful in ob­
taining a higher than normal bid for the hogs con­
signed. 
4. Many producers feel that terminals offer more com­
petitive bidding than do other markets but this is 
not necessarily true. There are more visible buyers 
but this does not assure competition. But the 
producer does have the advantage of having a man 
selling his hogs that is in the market every day. 
The commission firm should be more knowledgable with 
the daily market than is the average producer, but 
the producer will have to pay a commission firm*s 
services. 
The primary locations of packing plants in Iowa and 
southern Minnesota are shown in Figure 1, There are many 
smaller packing plants located throughout the state but not 
shown. Also, there are many concentration points either 
handled by a packing plant, private dealer, auction or co­
operative located throughout the area which may be an outlet 
for hogs. 
Figure 1, Location of major hog slaughtering plants 
in lov/a and Southern Minnesota 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
This chapter will outline in chronological order some of 
the previous hog marketing research. In some of these 
studies the researcher attempted to determine price dif­
ferentials between markets, other researchers* studies 
the entire hog marketing and hog slaughtering industry. Much 
of the more recent research was designed to determine how or 
why a producer would choose a particular market. At the same 
time, some research was directed toward finding a more ac­
curate method of evaluating hogs. 
The greater concern, shown by researchers in the last 
four decades, in hog marketing research can be contributed to 
the rise in direct marketing of hogs or the growth of interior 
Iowa packing plants. As direct marketing increased, pro­
ducers were forced to choose between alternative market out­
lets. Research workers, recognizing the increased complexity 
producers faced, attempted to develop some helpful guidelines 
to hog marketing, 
A series of studies conducted by the North Central 
Regional Livestock Research Committee examined all aspects of 
livestock marketing (29, 30, 32, 34). These studies will not 
be outlined, but they have contributed heavily to the live­
stock marketing body of knowledge. 
A group of students, under the direction of Paul Miller, 
Iowa State University Professor, performed most of the early 
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studies in hog marketing. 
One of these studies was "Hog Market Price Differentials" 
by Fitzgerald in 1925 (13). The purpose of his study was to 
specifically assist shipping association managers or indi­
vidual shippers to select the best market alternative. This 
study took place during the time when there were essentially 
two alternatives open to these people; (1) to ship hogs to 
terminal markets, or (2) to ship hogs directly to eastern 
packing plants. He visualized three primary problem areas 
and decided to: 
(1) Study the grade differentials in hog prices on 
some market and compare these differentials with 
like grade differentials in other markets, 
(2) Study market differentials for the same grade of 
hog. 
(3) Study the market differentials and grade dif­
ferentials at county shipping points, taking into 
consideration both marketing expenses and freight 
rate variations. 
Although Fitzgerald found grade price differentials 
during the period 1921-1924, he did not design any statis­
tically sound theory to explain it. Each market, Chicago, 
Sioux City, Buffalo, Omaha, St, Paul, and St, Louis — had 
different patterns of price differentials between grades. The 
price differentials appeared to be caused by seasonal vari­
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ation in receipts, however, Fitzgerald did not test this. 
The data available at this time were inadequate for this 
type of testing. 
In 1929, Hoffman (18), attempted to measure the price 
difference between interior marketing points and central 
terminal market. The growth of direct marketing which 
accounted for 50 percent of the hogs sold in Iowa prompted 
his study. 
Two later studies, one by Quintus in 1931, and one by 
Mimms in 1934» examined the same problem as Hoffman (27, 36), 
Quintus* study examined the period prices 1925 for the 
central and eastern markets during the 1925-1929 period and 
the prices for interior markets during the 1926-1931 period. 
Whereas Mimms examined the prices of the same markets during 
the 1930-1934 period. Both of these studies lack precise 
hog price data. They both made adjustments in the data, to 
offset the interior price reporting discrepancy, but the ad­
justments were arbitrary and lacked rigorous research 
techniques. Despite the lack of precise techniques, a 
definite price trend could be observed. The interior market 
hog prices were approaching the price level of Chicago. 
Cady, in 1933, gives an excellent history of the de­
velopment of hog marketing in Iowa (4 ). He disputes the 
then prevalent hypothesis that direct marketing was a new 
phenomena in hog marketing. He traces the early development 
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of packing plants in Iowa. He presents such facts as Des 
Moines by IÔ4O has established a pork packing business, 
Davenport by IÔ42, Dubuque by 1Ô45, Burlington by IÔ50, 
Muscatine had six packing plants before the Civil War, and he 
found that Keokuk had one of the earliest packing plants in 
Iowa. He also pointed out that by 1Ô49 two cities in Iowa, 
Keokuk and Burlington, packed more hogs than did Chicago. 
Keokuk during the 1&49-1#$0 period packed 19,000 hogs and 
Burlington 29,000 hogs, while Chicago packed only 11,900. 
Cady documents that during the middle 1800*s that hogs 
were marketed direct to merchant processors, to packers, or 
to consumers, without the use of intermediate middlemen. 
Therefore, Cady argues, direct marketing was not a new type 
of marketing that terminal marketing was of a more recent 
origin. He expands on the historical development of Iowa*s 
pork industry by pointing out that by 1Ô59 pork had become 
a staple product of Iowa, Not less than $1,500,000 had been 
paid out in the fall of 1059, in Iowa, to hog and as much 
more was kept for home consumption, Cady uses this statement 
to prove the importance of the hog industry in Iowa, 
Visit our river and railroad towns in the hog 
season and you have little else talked of than hogs. 
Go into the streets, and you see hogs; examine a 
railroad train, and you find the principal amount of 
freight and passengers to be hogs, Muscatine and 
Keokuk, two towns of less than one-sixth of the 
population of Cincinnati, the *Porkopolis of the 
West,* have packed this year one-fourth the number 
of hogs which that renowned city has put up. The 
most obvious and ready means of converting our com 
into cash; is by turning it to pork. 
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Cady adequately points out that direct marketing was not 
new and he, therefore, disputes such statements as those made 
by M. W, Bordus in 1929 (4, page 35), 
The issue is whether the present public, com­
petitive markets, which have been used over fifty 
years, shall be preserved or whether the private 
system of marketing, without competition of Govern­
ment regulation shall be substituted therefore. 
Cady contends that central terminal marketing was only a 
temporary phenomena. That terminal markets were in the phas­
ing out period. His estimates show that by 1932, two out of 
every three of Iowa's hogs were marketed at other than 
terminal markets. 
Cady also argues against those who contended that there 
was no competition in direct marketing. Many people felt 
that the terminal markets set the prices and that when pro­
ducers by-passed terminal yards they were weakening competi­
tion. His argument was that many people confuse price re­
porting and price determining. He felt that a price regis­
tering market was not necessarily the price making market. 
In 19351 the U. S. Department of Agriculture released a 
study, Direct Marketing of Hogs, which examined the changes 
in hog marketing (47), This study examined the evolution of 
both direct and terminal hog marketing. It discusses the 
primary factors which caused the growth of the methods of 
marketing hogs. The authors also discussed the factors which 
determine the price level of hogs and how these factors 
changed over time. 
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The study attempted to determine if the growth in direct 
marketing of hogs had a detrimental effect on hog prices. 
The contention had been made, and is still made that interior 
packing plants maintain a constant price differential be­
tween their prices and terminal market prices. 
To test if increased direct marketing had lessened com­
petition for livestock, the authors assumed that the live­
stock marketing margin would increase. They measured the 
differences between live hog prices and wholesale pork prices 
in two periods. Direct marketing increased rapidly during 
the period 1920-1934. Hence, the authors felt that, by com­
paring marketing margins in 1920 with 1934, they could learn 
if a larger market share was being taken by packing plants 
during the latter period. There was a larger spread in the 
later period but the authors felt most of this could be at­
tributed to higher labor costs, freight rates, and rents. 
The authors concluded this portion of the study by stating. 
Since these changes in marketing have affected 
retail prices of hog products and have not mate­
rially influenced the spread between hog prices and 
of hog products, it appears that the growth of direct 
marketing has little if any effect on the changes in 
the level of hog prices (4, page 137). 
The authors also stated that 
It is probable that to a limited degree, the 
increase in direct marketing of hogs may have 
caused the spread between farm prices and retail 
prices of hog products to have been less than it 
would have been otherwise (47, page 137). 
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The researchers of this study tried to examine the price 
reaction of packing firms and terminal markets. To measure 
the price reaction, they assumed a price leader should 
change prices most frequently and should be the first to 
change its price. They tested the price reaction two ways, 
(1) lagging interior Iowa prices one day from Chicago ter­
minal prices and (2) lagging Chicago one day from interior 
price changes. They found that when lagging interior Iowa 
plant prices one day from Chicago, the prices of both markets 
were in the same direction 32,9 percent of the time, but 
when lagging Chicago one day from interior Iowa, the move­
ment of prices was in the same direction 41.7 percent of the 
time. The authors found that the interior or direct market 
buyers lead 41 percent of the time and terminals or Chicago 
led only 33 percent of the time. It would not be reasonable 
to assume terminals were the price leaders. Therefore, in­
terior Iowa buyers advanced prices more often than did the 
Chicago terminal market (47, page 137). 
The authors concluded this part of the study by stating 
that, "On the average the producer has received somewhat more 
for hogs marketed direct than he would have received if these 
hogs had been sold through the central public market," (47, 
page 201). 
A 1938 study by Duddy and Reuzan (10), attempted to 
test essentially the same hypothesis as did the researchers 
of the above study, does direct marketing lessen competition. 
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Their approach to the problem was different than the previous­
ly discussed study. They computed the difference, in pro­
curement costs, between the two methods of buying hogs plus 
the freight rate differentials between Chicago and the in­
terior Iowa packing plants. The following table shows some 
of the results of Buddy and Reuzan's study. 
Table 2 indicates that from September, 1937, to December, 
1937, interior Iowa had prices higher than Chicago 77 percent 
of the time and an average price difference of 20 cents per 
100 pounds, Chicago was higher only 23 percent of the time, 
with price averaging only 5,9 cents per 100 pounds higher. 
Thus, they state, (10, page 120) 
If the analysis of the actual and potential 
price differences between Chicago and Des Moines 
markets is correct, the Iowa farmers is paid hand­
somely on more than one occassion in the past five 
years (1933-1937) for the privilege of selling 
nearer home, 
A more recent study by Stout and Feltner, Price Rela­
tionships in Market of Slaughter Hogs in Indiana, eliminates 
the shortcomings of most earlier studies. These earlier 
studies used market price quotations from U. S, Department of 
Agriculture Crop and Livestock Reporting Service. While 
these Crop and Livestock Reporting Service prices are 
representative for terminal market points, they are usually 
understated for interior Iowa marketing points. They are 
understated because these are not collected by Crop Reporting 
Service but are the result of receiving a telephone report 
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Table 2, Net hog price differences, Chicago over Des Moines; 
wholesale price at Chicago of 71.32 pounds of 
fresh and cured edible hog products; and the per­
centage of Iowa*s hog marketing shipped direct, 
1922-1937* 
Net difference Product Percent 
Month (cents per 100 lb.) prices directs 
im 
January 10,0 $ 5.33 56.1 
February 10.5 5.49 55.2 
March 10.0 6.21 57.5 
April 2.0 6.25 59.0 
May 4.0, 6.73 55.2 
June 1.0° 6.33 53.2 
July 6.5 6.82 52.3 
August 7.0 6.87 46.5 
September 14.0 7.07 37.6 
October 1.0 7.32 53.8 
November 8.5 7.24 58.0 
December 5.5 6.75 58.8 
mk 
January 10.5 6.70 51.2 
February 26.5 7.82 47.7 
March 8.5 8.40 48.9 
April 1.5 8.22 52.2 
May 18.0 8.09 53.5 
June 14.0 8.75 53.5 
July 3.0 9.17 53.5 
August 7.0, 10.47 54.0 
September 4.0j 11.69 52.4 
October 3.52 10.60 51.5 
November 14.5® 9.99 52.5 
December 21.0^  10.12 53.7 
i22i 
January 28.5J 11.74 59.9 
February 15.Ob 12.51 63*1 
March 49.0b 13.31 63.8 
April 22.0b 13.34 65.9 
May 15.0b 13.81 65.5 
June 14.5b 14.20 61.7 
July 0.5^  15.00 56.4 
August 22,0b 16.57 59.4 
September 22,Ob 16,38 63.2 
October 3.5. 15.55 58,9 
November 10.5? 14.84 67.1 
December 13.5b 14.68 66.8 
*Data taken from Duddy and Reizan (10). 
D^es Moines over Chicago. 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Met difference Product Percent 
Month (cents per 100 lb. ) prices directs 
January 14.0» 
February 3.5 
March 5.5, 
April 15.5b 
May 15.5b 
June 19.5° 
July 2.5 
August 16.5~ 
September 26.5^  
October 20.50 
November 16.5^  
December 23.0" 
1937 
January 25.5J 
February 20.Oj 
March 20.05 
April 40,5° 
May 42.05 
June 20.5° 
July 7.5, 
August 10.50 
September 10,0 
October 12.5 
November Ô. 0 
December 5.5 b 
$13.61 63.6 
13.33 " 65.6 13.0a 63. a 13.26 67.2 
12.03 65.9 13.20 6a. a 13.61 61.4 
13.90 59.5 13.aa 63.6 
12.92 62.9 12.36 61.5 12. â3 63.1 
13.0a 61. a 12, aa 64.6 
12.79 65.a 
12.95 69. a 
13.5a 69.7 
14.15 67.0 
15.15 65.4 
15.90 62.4 
15.77 64.4 
14.27 67.1 
12.59 66.6 
11.32 66.7 
from these markets as to what is the typical price. These 
markets are under no obligation to report the accurate 
prices. But, Stout andPeltner avoided this error by col­
lecting their own prices. They did this by putting an 
observer on the market to record the prices paid for slaugh­
ter hogs within four different weight groups. Three periods 
were studied, September 14-25, 1959; November 30-December 11, 
1959; and February 15-26, I960, 
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Correlation and regression analysis and measures of 
significant difference were used to analyze prices paid at 
the Indianapolis Stock Yards and the 25 largest surrounding 
daily hog markets in Indiana. 
The conclusions drawn from this study were that terminal 
markets would not be regarded as the primary price basing 
point for hogs in the 200-220 and 220-240 pound weight ; that 
the higher prices, at the terminal, for these weight hogs 
were not large enough to cover the added transportation 
costs; but, that the terminal markets did meet the criteria 
of price basing point for the 240-270 pound hogs. They also 
concluded that there was (1) no long-run price advantages to 
patrons of a particular market, and (2) that the small mar­
kets enjoyed no privilege of price domination beyond the 
small area in which these markets enjoyed a locational ad­
vantage, 
A study by Maki and Strand (22), provides some additional 
knowledge about producers. Maki and Strand asked hog pro­
ducers what major factors were used to choose a particular 
market outlet? The predominant factor listed by producers 
was the convenience of a market. The second factor listed 
was "best price" and third, the most competitive market. 
Producers also stated that they felt it took less skill to 
market hogs than it did to market cattle. Producers felt the 
specialized services offered at terminal markets were not 
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needed when marketing hogs. The closeness of a market to the 
farm is important to producers and Maki and Strand found that 
Except for sales through terminal markets, 
practically all slaughter hogs were sold through 
markets located within 50 miles of each producer. 
Moreover, the modal mileage group for the latter 
markets was *under 10 miles,* or about a tenth of 
the average hauling distance of sales in the modal 
mileage group for the terminal markets, 
A more recent study by Maki ^  al,, discusses the eco­
nomic structure of the meat industry (21), This study at­
tempts to outline those forces which not only affect the 
consumption and production of our livestock, but how these 
factors affect the historical patterns of livestock marketing 
and meat distribution. The study was concluded by showing 
how Ideational patterns of production are related to the 
framework of interregional competition in the livestock meat 
economy. 
The next group of studies can be categorized into one 
group. They are studies concerned with determining a better 
method of evaluating hogs when hogs are bought by the grade 
and yield method. The researchers in these studies have 
tested various factors which correlate highly with the higher 
yields of meat. A few of the major evaluating factors are 
average back thickness, length of carcass and weight of car­
casses, An early study by Shepard et al,, in 1940 pointed 
out that the carcass method of evaluating carcasses might be 
more accurate than many present methods of evaluating ani­
mals (3&). 
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Engelraan ^  aji., in 1953 carried carcass research 
further, they compared the results obtained when estimating 
the yield of meat using the carcass method and by the live 
method (12), Engelman et sQ,., also pointed out the advan­
tages of each method of evaluating hogs. 
Naive and Cox in 1957 tested the accuracy of other 
factors used when yields were estimated by the carcass basis 
(28 ) .  
Most of carcass studies indicate that the most accurate 
method of estimating yield from a carcass was to estimate the 
yield of the four primal cuts (hams, butts, loin, and picnics) 
and from this estimate, the total yield of meat. The most 
accurate factors for measuring ham, loins, butts, and picnics 
were the weight of the carcass and the average backfat thick­
ness, Most of these carcass studies found that the length 
of the carcass does not add much accuracy to yield estimates. 
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THE MARKET BEHAVIOR OF HOG BUYING PLANTS 
The economic structure of the meat industry is 
characterized by the number and size of firms and 
establishments, the geographical location of these 
establishments, the rate of entry of new firms in 
the industry, the degree of vertical integration or 
specialization and the extent of product differen­
tiation, The structural attributes are believed to 
account for the behavioral relationships of the firms 
are extremely difficult to ascertain; (21, pages 
701-702) 
This chapter, however, will attempt to point out some 
of the structural features of the livestock and meat in­
dustry to understand how firms might react under different 
conditions. The discussion in this chapter will be confined 
to packing firms operating in the area of monopsony or 
oligopsony and not in the traditional competitive framework, 
Nicholls said, "The fact that processor-distributors do not 
directly control the short run supply of the farm products, 
has therefore frequently been interpreted as precluding the 
existence of imperfect competition among them," (31, page 1). 
The discussion will be limited primarily to the buying 
side of the hog paclTing business. The hog buying side is 
closely related to the selling side, but the selling effects 
will generally be ignored. The following influences will 
also be ignored, the effect of, economics of plant operation 
caused by the ridigities of labor employment, the ease of 
entry of firms, the effect of selling side locational ad­
vantage, the effects of differentiated finished products. 
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and the effect of any other factors which influence a firmes 
market conduct or performance. These factors will be assumed 
to remain constant throughout the analysis. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine what kind of 
structure or what kind of competition does exist on the 
buying side of hog packing plants or hog buying agencies. 
Also, to determine if this situation might explain why there 
could exist price differentials between various hog buying 
firms. Before examining the type of competition vrtiich might 
exist, in the hog packing industry, it might be helpful to 
delineate the number and type of hog buying firms in Iowa. 
There are over 1,200 possible buyers of livestock in 
Iowa and most of these buyers would be purchasing both cat­
tle and hogs (22). With over 1,200 hog buyers, how can the 
hog buying activity depart from the purely competitive 
model? There are, within the state of Iowa or near its 
borders, about 20 large pork packing plants located off the 
central public markets which will be referred to as interior 
packing plants (see Figure 1). There are also packing plants 
located adjacent to the following central public markets, 
Sioux City, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; Chicago, Illinois; St. 
Joseph, Missouri; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Paul, Minnesota; 
and St. Louis, Missouri. Combining the interior Iowa plants 
with central market plants there are over 50 major packer 
processing plants available to Iowa*s producers. These 
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packer-processor plants are the major focal point for the 
pricing of hogs in Iowa, These packing plants are in inte­
gral part of the national market for finished or processed 
meat. The prices paid by these markets are influenced by the 
total supply of meat and the consumer demand as it is trans­
ferred through the consumer-retailer-wholesaler-processor-
producer sectors. 
The theory presented in this chapter is essentially the 
same as that used by Nicholls in his book, Imperfect Compe-
tition with Agricultural Industries (31), 
The degree to which agricultural related industries 
operate in a quasi-monopsonistic framework, in respect to the 
purchasing of producers hogs, depends on their ability to 
differentiate their buying services, A major factor creating 
the differentiation of buying services is spatial location. 
Most of the spatial advantage, that one plant has over a-
nother, is primarily caused by lower transportation cost to 
producers marketing hogs. However, there may be other agri­
cultural related services, located at a particular market 
point, that may contribute to the differentiation of a pack­
ing plant or market, A producer might use the opportunity 
to purchase other supplies when marketing his livestock, thus 
reducing actual marketing costs to a very low level. Before 
moving into a more precise discussion, it might be helpful 
to examine factors which might affect specific hog buying 
firms. 
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Interdependence not Recognized 
The first discussion will be centered around firms that 
have many competitors and that no one firm recognizes his 
influence on the action of other buying firms, this would 
eliminate the effect of oligopsonistic interdependence. 
Oligopsonistic interdependence will be examined later. 
Producer preferences for particular hog buying firms will 
affect the actions of those firms or markets. The markets 
preferred by particular producers selling their products will 
be referred to as service differentiated markets even though 
the producer preferences may not be due to definite services 
offered by the buying firm, but due to other factors which 
are peculiarly attached to that market by the livestock pro­
ducer, Some of these services are convenient location of the 
buyer to the producer, reputation of the buyer, personality 
of the buyer or other attributes which may be attached to a 
particular buyer, the speed and efficiency which the hogs are 
handled and payments are made, and the "fairness" of grading 
and/or weighing. All these factors plus many others, real or 
fancied, contribute to the differentiation of buying services. 
They contribute to differentiation as long as the seller, 
livestock producer, feels that these attributes are a part of 
the market and they will continue to be effective as long as 
the seller uses these attributes to choose a particular hog 
market. 
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Buying under pure competition, the individual buyer*s 
volume of purchases is completely dependent upon his com­
petitors' prices, since the services one firm offers are 
identical to others. But, with producers preferences, a 
buyer has some independence of action, there is no longer one 
single large market, rather a netwrk of interrelated mar­
kets, Under these conditions, a buyer's volume of purchase 
will depend on his conscious choice of services. The buyer's 
volume is also dependent on the buying costs incurred and 
the prices offered. The firm can no longer just buy on the 
basis of those prices thrust upon him by the competitive 
forces of market which are beyond his control, A buying firm 
operating in a pure competitive and free entry framework, if 
the firm is optimizing, will have a perfectly horizontal 
purchase curve. The purchase curve, of a differentiated 
buyer, will diverge from horizontal, A buyer operating in a 
preference framework has the choice of raising his buying 
price and buying more hogs or lowering it and buying less. 
Also, the firm's buying price will be dependent on how much 
his services differ from those of his competitors, A firm 
has some incentive to change the services he offers to appeal 
to new producers, A firm may influence his volume, of pur­
chases, by making additional buying service outlays, such as 
solicitation by personal contact and advertising. The pro­
blem in this type of framework, facing the buying firm, is 
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to determine the correct combination of prices, services and 
buying costs, which are all variable to some extent, that will 
maximize his returns. 
Studies have been made that indicate producers do have 
preferences for particular markets. Maki et al., in his 
study "Iowa^ s Producers Choice of Markets," indicated that 
the primary reason producers chose a particular market, for 
their hogs, was the convenience of that market. "The most 
convenient market, however, was the dominant reason in the 
choice of a specified market outlet for hogs. . ." (22). 
The U. S. Department of Agriculture also made a study of 
producer hog market preferences the statement from that re­
port reads: 
The market outlet which farmers said were the 
most convenient were local dealers, packing plants 
and concentration yards, in the order named. The 
greatest convenience as stated by many, was that 
hogs would be moved to such markets by truck. A 
substantial number selling to local dealers at con­
centration yards and at packing plants did so because 
they knew the price in advance. Less shrinkage was 
given by a substantial portion as the reason for 
selling at concentration yards, packing plants, 
auctions and local dealers. Other reasons given 
were that small lots sold more advantageously, that 
better service was obtained, and that control of 
sales...was possible... A considerable number 
preferred cooperative livestock shipping associa­
tions because they liked the cooperative principle. 
Of those favoring public markets, four percent gave 
their own opposition to direct marketing as a 
reason for this preference," (47, page 106). 
Since producers preferences for markets do exist, how 
might these preferences affect the individual firm's pur­
chasing curve? The AC curve in Figure 2 represents the 
Figure 2. Average cost curve for hog 
buying firms 
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quantities of hogs which will be offered to a firm, assuming 
that all rival buyers simultaneously change their prices as 
this firm or any firm changes its prices. The curve AC is a 
long-run aggregate supply curve for hogs. This curve indi­
cates that, if hog production is to increase, resources will 
have to be pulled away from alternative uses. With pure 
competition, the firm's AC curve or purchasing curve would 
be perfectly horizontal. But, with some differentiation, the 
curve can depart from horizontal. The ac curve shows the 
volume of hogs available to a given buyer at different prices 
and services, when the prices and services of all other 
buyers remain unchanged. 
The curve ac is more elastic than AC, This is true be­
cause a price increase by a single buyer will result in a 
larger increase in volume of purchases, if other buyers do 
not make the price change. When a single buyer raises his 
price from OS to OT, he will buy TB pounds of hogs, if his 
competitors do not raise their prices. But if the other 
buying firms do raise prices, the firm will buy only TA, 
Also, if the same firm lowers his price from OS to OR, his 
volume of purchases will drop to RC, but if his competitors 
follow the price change the volume will drop to only RD, 
The elasticity of ac is an index of producers preference for 
the services of one buyer over other buyers. The less pre­
ference shown the closer the ac curve will approach AC, 
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Differentiated Services 
The analysis will change if additional assumptions are 
made. Let us assume that all services of each particular 
buyer are fixed but differentiated. In this case, there are 
still many buyers and that the effects of individual action 
will be diffused. Which means, that gains made from a price 
change by one firm will not be equally shared by all other 
buyers, A firm operating in this type of market will not 
have to consider the action of his competitors. He can, with 
out fear of retaliatory action, induced by his own actions, 
pursue an aggressive price policy. 
Two other primary curves will be added to those curves 
on Figure 2 to develop Figure 3. They are dar and dmr as 
developed by Nicholls (31). 
dar = The price a producer can pay for inputs (hogs 
in this case) which is obtained by subtracting 
processing and distribution costs from gross 
revenue of the firm, 
dmr " Is the curve of the addition to total net 
revenue. 
Superimposing the above curves plus the marginal cost 
curve mc, for the firm which is represented by ac. Figure 3 
is obtained. With a purchase curve located at ac, the 
intersection of mc curve with dmr indicates the price paid 
by this firm for hogs will be OK and volume purchased will be 
Figure 3. The price and produrement level 
of hogs by hog buying firms 
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OH, The excess profits in this case would be JR x OH, If 
ac was representative of every firm in the industry, a 
different price pattern would result. This condition would 
exist if each producer had evenly distributed preferences, 
so that each buying firm had no advantage over his competi­
tors, then, AC would represent the price of hogs to every 
buyer, not ac. 
Continuing the analysis, if EF is the original buying 
price, any movement of prices upward toward HJ will expand 
purchases to OH, Each firm would move prices in the same 
direction. As these price increases take place, the gain will 
prove illusory, because the gain in business would be shown 
by AC not ac. Yet, the ac curve explains why each buyer will 
feel he can bid up his prices. The movement upward will 
continue until the price of KL and volume OG is reached. 
The upward price movement will stop at KL because, at this 
point, ac meets with AC and marginal costs (mc) equals de­
rived marginal revenue (dmr). 
At this point excess profits KLMN are obtained. How­
ever, this position would not be stable because new firms 
would be able to enter the industry. Even though the new 
firms could not exactly duplicate the older firmes services, 
they could conceivably approximate them close enough to 
enter the industry and gain a portion of the hog supply. New 
firms entering the industry would force the AC curve to move 
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to the left. The leftward movement would continue until the 
ac curve was tangent to the derived average revenue curve 
(dar). Figure 4 illustrates this position. The price SQ 
is lower than it was when there was no differentiation of 
services. Also the quantity purchased OS is less than OU, 
The volume under pure competition is represented by OU, 
whereas, OS represents the volume when there are differentia­
ted services. 
The existence of the situation first described in 
Figure 3 could well have been the position of (independent) 
interior Iowa packers before the major packers moved away 
from the terminal markets. The independent packers located 
within interior Iowa had certain Ideational and services 
factors that must have attracted producers so these interior 
plants could obtain hogs even with lower buying prices. But 
the movement of more packing plants into the interior caused 
profits to be squeezed. Whether the present packing industry 
has reached the point shown in Figure 4, that Chamberlih 
describes as "sort of ideal" is not known (5). It would ap­
pear that with the present interest in establishing new plants 
in Iowa, that the "sort of ideal" has not been reached. How­
ever, it is possible, in a dynamic framework of imperfect 
knowledge, for firms to speculate that there are excess pro­
fits in an industry when, in fact, none exists. Upon entering 
the industry, the new firms find that no excess profit exists. 
Figure 4. The effect of competition on 
monopsonistic hog buying firms 
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Imperfect knowledge of profits is one of the factors that 
contributes to over capacity in an industry. 
Terminal Market Buying and Direct Buying 
» 
To expand or clarify the analysis of buying firms re­
action further, two specific types of competitive services 
will be analyzed. One type of service is offered by terminal 
markets; another type is offered by packers buying hogs 
direct. Before proceeding with the analysis, one assumption 
will be made -- that prices will be fixed, but not services. 
All packers, in this example, will be initially buying their 
hogs from the terminal yards as was true for most packers 50 
years ago. The purchase curve of the packer buying on the 
terminal yard will be ac-t as shown in Figure 5A, curve act 
represents direct buying. When the packer buys at the termi­
nal market, his derived average revenue is dar-t as shown in 
Figure 5B. The assumption, as stated above, indicates that 
prices will be fixed at OR or OK, Figure 5B. The amount of 
-hogs a packer can buy through terminals is OA as indicated 
by curve ac^ , Figure 5A. A packer buying hogs at price OR 
and volume OA can made excess profit TSUR. The excess pro­
fits exist because the dart curve of Figure 5B indicates 
firms could actually pay OU prices rather than OR prices. 
The entry of new firms into the market will cause profits to 
fall because the volume of each plant will be reduced toward 
OB (Figure 5B). The reduction in volume purchased by each 
Figure 5. Terminal market buying and direct buying 
price of hogs in dollars per cwt. 
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firm will cause ac-t to shift toward ac\, at which point 
excess profits disappear, as shown by point V on Figure 5B. 
But, a packer might avoid the decline in volume by 
improving services offered to producers. He might do this 
by setting up country buying points, which all were con­
venient to producers marketing hogs. These new sercices may 
be a more expensive method of buying hogs than buying at the 
terminal yards, but if enough producers are attracted to 
these newer services, a packer may expect to increase his 
profits. If the services offered by his competition re­
main unchanged; the additional volume, at set prices, might 
assure him some excess profits. The change or improvement in 
services will shift his supply curve along RK from ac^  to 
acd (Figure $A). Because of the shifting of costs, the de­
rived average revenue dar^  will decline toward dar^ j (Figure 
5B), How far it will decline largely depends on the in­
creased operating costs. If only one firm would make the 
shift to greater services, excess profits could be realized. 
The equilibrium would be reached only when dar finally 
reached the level of dar^  as shown in Figure 5B. This would 
probably be the point where packers offered the correct 
combination of services, direct buying and terminal buying, 
that satisfied all producers. The equilibrium point would be 
reached only when no more additional services could be of­
fered by any firm and no firm was making excess profits. In 
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a dynamic framework this point is probably never reached, as 
new innovations are continually introducing new factors into 
the market. Also, inadequate or inaccurate knowledge pre­
vents firms from discerning how to satisfy all producer 
wants at any given time. 
The previous analysis assumed that prices were fixed but 
if both prices and services were allowed to vary full equi­
librium would not be achieved until each buyer felt that 
further changes, in either prices or services, would not, 
improve his profit position. 
Chamberlin stated, (5, page 99) 
As soon as we recognize that the buying price 
is variable, however, the fact that the price paid 
by a buyer offering given services must be lower 
under monopsonistic than pure competition insures 
that the services will be somewhat inferior. This 
is true simply because, if a buyer could, by a 
larger scale of operations which is characteristic 
of pure competition as compared with monopsonistic 
competition, give the same services for less money, 
he could, similarly, give better services for the 
same money. 
Oligopsonistic Interdependence 
While the previous discussion has some validity, because 
it helps to expose a few basic points, most packing firms do 
realize their actions will have an influence on other packing 
firms. Whether they generalize this knowledge and apply it 
to all packing firms or only those packing firms adjacent to 
them is immaterial in the final analysis. 
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The recognition of interdependence was portrayed by a 
buyer for a western Iowa packing plant. This western Iowa 
packing plant usually obtains most of its hogs from nearby 
producers, but occasionally they find themselves short of hogs, 
not enough hogs to finish out a particular day's kill. In 
order to fill out their kill, the packing plant buys hogs at 
the terminal yards. In the light of this situations, a 
packer buyer of this plant was asked, why the plant filled 
out their kill with terminal market bought hogs; why didn't 
they just raise country prices 25 to 50 cents per hundred 
pounds? With a price raise of this magnitude, the packing 
plant could obtain sufficient supplies without going to the 
terminal markets and the locally purchased hogs would not 
cost any more, because the packer would save transportation 
costs. The buyer's answer to this was, "If we raised the 
local price of hogs, to fill our kill, we would cause other 
interior packers to raise their buying price, thereafter, our 
hogs would cost more." This statement may not be rational, 
but as long as the buyer felt it was true, it will affect his 
buying policy. Interdependence was recognized by this buyer. 
The recognition or existance of price interdependence 
does not imply that packers feel there is service interde­
pendence. Most packing firms do not have the identical 
services, some firm's services are preferred over others. 
However, interdependence does mean that a given change in ser­
vices offered by one firm will affect other firms which 
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provide similar services. This is true, even if these ser­
vices are a result of spatial location. 
If the economic structure of an industry is such that 
individual firms are aware that any actions taken by them 
will be followed by their competitors, this is called oli­
gopsony, How would the prices for hogs be determined under 
an oligopsony situation? 
The reactions of the competitors is the important fac­
tor in an oligopsony framework. Figure 6 includes the curves 
dar and dmr, AC, ac, and a'c* found in Figure 3, In the 
earlier case, when oligopsonistic influence was small, the 
price was EF, Originally, the price was bid up to GL when 
the number of firms was limited. Also in the earlier ex-
ample, AC was not based on reactions of competitors, rather 
it simply indicated the actual movement of prices as the firms 
acted independently. The analysis was based on the fact that 
each firm throught the other firms would not follow their 
price movement, but the fact that they did caused price ex­
pectations to move along AC. 
But, if competition is largely confined to only a few 
close competitors, AC slope will depend upon the reaction of 
these competitors to a change in price or service policy. 
If the firms in the industry, develop a non-aggressive 
pricing policy, firms would do this because they had learned 
that aggressive action was followed by their competitors, 
the pertinent buying curve would be AC in Figure 6 not ac. 
Figure 6, The reaction of competitors to 
appressive and nonaggressive 
buying policies 
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The price would EF for a given number of firms, that is, no 
entry. If firms do not estimate competitors reactions, ac is 
the more appropriate pricing curve. If, however, an indi­
vidual firm feels his services are different and others cannot 
duplicate them, the firm will expect to operate on curve ac, 
but will actually move along AC. The greater the number of 
buyers, the closer the price will be to GL, The reason 
stability could be attained at some point between EF and GL, 
with an aggressive policy, is that at some point marginal 
costs equal derived average revenue (i.e., m'c* = dmr). 
If prices remained at EF, it would mean that firms had, 
by their actions, decided market sharing was the best long 
run policy. Although as this analysis shows, it would not be 
necessary to have agreement between the various packing firms. 
Free Entry of Firms 
Since the earlier discussions, in most cases, were 
limited to a given number of firms, excess profits could be 
maintained. But, this is an unrealistic assumption in a 
dynamic market. Therefore, the analysis will be extended to 
show a final equilibrium position when there is relatively 
free entry of firms. There are two positions which can be 
contemplated from the previous analysis, one where the firms 
follow an aggressive policy, that is, they do not recognize 
interdependence and two, where interdependence is recognized 
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and that the action of a competitor can be estimated exactly, 
so that a non-aggressive pricing policy or oligopsony is 
followed. Figure 7 shows these positions and prices. 
Price EG is the price for hogs under the non-aggressive 
price policy. Here firms recognize that AC is the appro­
priate response curve. When AC is tangent to derived average 
revenue curve (dar) an equilibrium position is reached. 
There exists no excess profits at this position. With an 
aggressive policy, the firm will operate as if ac was the 
buying curve, at F, ac is tangent to dar, EF is the hog price 
and there is no excess profits. It can be noted that the 
price is higher and volume is larger than they are under the 
non-aggressive price policy. Both the price and the volume 
are lower in the preceding case, than they would be if the 
firms were operating competitively with no differentiation 
of buying services. The average cost curve, in a purely 
competitive framework, would be parallel to the base and 
tangent to the derived average revenue curve at a higher point 
than FH, The case represented by volume OF and prices FH is 
the "sort of ideal" mentioned by Chamberlain discussed 
earlier. This price is higher than an oligopsony price, but 
lower than a purely competitive price. Exactly where the 
present packing firms or industry are operating is not known, 
but there are conditions, within the industry, which would 
make the industry depart from the purely competitive model. 
Figure 7. Long run equilibrium position 
of hog buying firms 
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Being that it is difficult for firms to anticipate how far or 
fast a competitor can duplicate prices and services would 
seem to indicate the industry is operating in a manner which 
would place them somewhat between price EG and price FH. 
How much lower present how prices are, than they would 
be if the packing firms were buying in a pure competitive 
framework, is not known, but they are obviously lower. 
Selling Side Effects 
The preceding discussion has been limited to the buying 
side of packing companies but in actual practice, the buying 
side is an integral part of the total plant operation. 
Actions taken on the selling side will affect the buying side 
and vice versa. The assumption made in this analysis was 
that there are identical selling prices. This is an over 
simplification of the real world. Each packing plant has 
different prices for some of their finished pork products. 
There is more differentiation of pork products than there is 
for beef. Government grading of beef has eliminated most of 
differentiation attempted by large national packing firms. 
But, pork has no Federal consumer grades. Each packing 
company develops and promotes its own brands on cured pork 
products, i.e., hams, picnics, bacon, and prepared meats. 
Packers have not been very successful in differentiating fresh 
pork cuts, but this has and is being tried. National packers 
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have an advantage over small packing companies in that they 
have wider distribution of their products and can advertise 
nationally. 
Therefore, if a packer can differentiate its products in 
the eyes of consumers, it will be able to raise prices on 
those products preferred by consumers. The higher price 
charged for successfully differentiated products may make it 
possible for these packers to pay more for hogs than those 
without preferred products. If packers can do this, part of 
the preceding analysis will be incorrect. However, if the 
cost of differentiation, advertising, promotion, etc. re­
sults in higher operating costs, then the effect may be only 
negligible. 
The primary purpose of the preceding analysis was to 
discuss why there might exist price differences between hog 
markets. The purpose was also to discuss the rationals which 
might cause some packing plants, buying hogs, to pay higher 
prices than other packing plants do. The preceding analysis 
might also help explain why there might be excess capacity 
in the industry. That is, packing plant capacity larger than 
one might expect from a purely competitive industry. 
The explanation of packing firm action is greatly 
simplified and many of the assumptions were extremely limited 
and unrealistic. Yet, the discussion does explain some of 
the market behavior of individual packing firms. 
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A great deal needs to be learned about packing firms 
buying policies if one is to understand the effects on 
producers. The continual establishment of new packing firms 
in the industry further complicates producer selling deci­
sions. However, it is possible that the greater concen­
tration of packing firms, within a given production area, 
may eliminate price differences created by spatial location 
and other specialized services. However, this could cause 
packing firms to more readily recognize interdependence and 
thereby forcing the industry to operate more like an 
oligopsony than it does now. 
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PROCEDURE 
This study was designed to measure the hog price dif­
ferential between different markets and methods of marketing. 
The hogs for this study were procured, by Iowa State Uni­
versity, from the Bisland Memorial farm at Madrid, Iowa. The 
hogs, a by-product of irradiation research on their sires, 
were purchased after they were no longer needed for research 
by the University. The normal policy is to keep the market­
able hogs on the farm only 154 days after farrowing, then 
they are marketed. The hogs used in this study were dept, 
separate by litters, for 154 days. After 154 days, the hogs 
were removed from their litter pens, weighed, and transferred 
into holding pens. The hogs were divided into eight weight 
groups. Equal numbers of each weight group were put into 
four separate pens or lots. No attempt was made to separate 
the hogs by grade, it was believed that, if the selection was 
made only by weight, the grade of hogs would be randomly 
distributed between pens. If there were any tendency for 
certain weight groups to grade higher, then each lot would 
have equal chance to receive them. 
All hogs, for a given shipment, did not come out of lit­
ter pens on identical days. The farrowings were staggered, seme 
days insufficient hogs were available to make up four full 
lots or pens. The procedure followed in this case was to 
retain the hogs in the holding pens until enough hogs were 
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were assembled to make four normal truck loads. The hogs of 
four shipments or one block of shipments were marketed on 
identical days. 
Six markets were selected to represent the three pri­
mary methods of marketing hogs in Iowa, The markets se­
lected and a brief discription of their activities are as 
follows : 
Sioux City Terminal Market — hogs sold live, generally 
mixed but some sort at times -- Sioux City, Iowa, 
Omaha Terminal Yards -- sold the same method as Sioux 
City — Omaha, Nebraska. 
Waterloo, Iowa — hogs sold carcass grade and yield. 
Des Moines, Iowa — carcass grade and yield. 
Fort Dodge, Iowa — hogs sold live sort,^  
Cedar Rapids, Iowa — hogs sold live sort,^  
Since there were six markets and only four lots (there 
were only four lots available on the farm and the AEC did 
not want these salvage hogs to interfere with their other 
research operations) an incomplete randomized block design 
was used to select markets. 
The markets were selected by an incomplete randomized 
block design and the lots were selected by using Snedecor's 
randomized table of random numbers (40). 
I^nstructions to buyer were to sort them in a way they 
could bring the highest possible price. 
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The information for each block of shipments was sealed 
in envelopes until the day of shipment, at which time the 
farm manager opened the envelope to determine market 
each lot was to be shipped. 
The following block design outlined by Cochran and Cox 
(6, pages 471-472) was used: 
First Marketing Period 
Date shiDDed Block Market Market Designation 
August 26, 1963 1 1 -2 -3 -4 Cedar Rapids 1 
August 29, 1963 2 1-4-5-6 Fort Dodge 2 
September 3, 1963 3 2-3-5 -6 Sioux City 3 
September 4» 1963 4 1-2-3-5 Omaha 4 
September 9, 1963 5 1-2-4-6 Des Moines 5 
September 10, 1963 6 4-5 Waterloo 6 
The pattern for the second marketing period was dif­
ferent from the first in that for each block, three dif­
ferent methods of marketing were in each block. During the 
first marketing period it was possible to have only two 
methods of marketing in each block. Also, the greatest dif­
ferences found in the first marketing period were between 
carcass grade and yield method and terminal markets so the 
next experiment was designed to assure the greatest number of 
comparisons possible between these methods. 
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Date Shipped 
February 27, 1964 
Second Marketing Period 
Block Market 
1 1-2 "4 "5 
1~3"5"6 
3 -4 "5 -6 
2 -4 '5 "6 
1-2-3-6 
1-3-4-5 
March 2, 1964 
March 5, 1964 
March 9, 1964 
March 12, I964 
March 1Ô, 1964 
4 
6 
5 
3 
2 
There were a total of 1,003 hogs shipped during the 
first marketing period with an average initial weight of 
204.4 pounds per head. A total of 1,032 hogs during the 
second period with an average weight of 197.5 pounds per 
head,see Table 3. 
A check was devised to determine if lots within a given 
block were similar, although the analysis does not rest on 
the validity of this check. The check was obtained by com­
puting a composite value for each lot or shipment. The com­
posite value was obtained by obtaining the meanprice of six 
interior Iowa markets, by weight group, from the Des Moines 
Register on each day a shipment was made. The six interior 
markets were Des Moines, Fort Dodge, Mason City, Waterloo, 
Ottumwa No, 2, and Storm Lake, The price quotations were 
separated into the following weight groups: I7O-I&O lbs,, 
iao-190 lbs,, 190-200 lbs,, 200-220 lbs,, 220-230 lbs,, 230-
240 lbs,, 240-250 lbs,, and 250-260 lbs. The individual 
Table 3. The distribution of hog weights sold during the two marketing periods 
Weight groups - pounds 
Block 170-179 180-189 190-199 200-229 230-239 2U0'2L9 290-259 260-269 270"^^ 
Fall Market Period -No. head-
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
Total 
% in wt. 
group 
4 37 15 93 14 2 2 
13 43 38 94 9 1 1 
8 31 42 90 12 6 1 
8 32 37 100 9 4 1 1 
10 38 45 100 16 8 2 1 
16 16 31 48 12 4 1 
59 197 208 525 72 25 8 2 
3.97 17.82 19.57 48.66 6.65 2.40 0.65 0.28 
Spring Market Period 
1st 28 53 37 58 5 
2nd 20 43 39 50 3 2 1 1 1 
3rd 25 38 75 6 6 2 1 
4th 22 33 48 46 3 4 
5 th 14 37 57 8 7 1 
6th 22 48 38 44 5 2 
Total 131 252 261 330 30 21 4 2 1 
% in wt. 
group 12.69 24.42 25.29 31.97 2.91 2.03 0.39 0.19 0 
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mean price of each weight group was multiplied times the 
weight of each hog falling into that weight group. Since the 
quotations contained overlap in the weight breakdown in the 
quotations, (i.e., 170-130, 180-190, there are two weight 
groups the 1Ô0 lb, hog could go into), a hog that weighted 
1Ô0 pounds was moved into the higher weight group and the 
same procedure was followed for all other duplications. A 
composite value of the shipment or lot was obtained by all of 
the individual hog values. The total composite value of a 
shipment was divided by the total weight of the shipment to 
obtain the composite price of that shipment, A comparison of 
the composite prices, for each lot within a block, would give 
some measure of the consistency of the sort. If large dif­
ferences between lots, within a block, had been found, it 
would have eliminated any need for further analysis. Be­
cause, most of the differences would have been due to sort 
and the differences between markets could not have been de­
tected. 
Two basic prices were used to analyze the data obtained 
in this study. These prices were computed for each shipment 
of hogs to a market. 
One of these was called market weight price. Market 
weight price was computed by dividing the total value of a 
shipment (minus any marketing charges assessed by a market) 
by the weight of the hogs as they reached the market. 
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Market weight price = 
The other price was original weight price. Original 
weight price was computed by dividing the total value of a 
shipment (minus any marketing charges) by the original weight 
(weight of the hogs as they came out of litter pens) of the 
hogs. 
Original weight price - (value of shlpnent)-(marketing charge) 
original weight of hogs 
The only marketing charges deducted for the interior sold 
hogs were the deduction for the American Meat Board. The 
marketing charges deducted from terminal sold hogs were com­
mission, yardage fee, cost of feed fed to hogs on the market 
prior to sale, fire insurance, inspection fee and American 
Meat Board deductions. 
The truckers hauling the hogs were unaware this study was 
being conducted. If the markets, involved in the study, were 
aware that the data from the hogs sales were being analyzed 
for market price differences, they could seriously bias the 
data. Therefore, truckers were informed, if they raised any 
questions about the numerous ways hogs were being marketed, 
that this was normal government policy. Most of the truckers 
were aware that the AEG was operated partly by the United 
States government and that previous shipments were sent to 
many different markets. 
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ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Analysis of variance and multiple regressions were used 
to analyze the data from this study. The regressions were 
designed to measure hog price differences between markets 
and/or different methods of marketing. The methods of mar­
keting selected in this study were represented by (1) two 
terminal markets (Sioux City and Omaha), (2) two interior 
Iowa packing plants using carcass grade and yield buying 
methods (Des Moines and Waterloo) and (3) two interior Iowa 
packing plants buying hogs on a live sort basis (Fort Dodge 
and Cedar Rapids).^  
The data for this study were collected during two 
marketing periods. The first period was during August and 
September, 1963. The first marketing period had 22 ship­
ments of hogs. The 22 shipments were divided into five blocks 
of four shipments and one block of two shipments. The second 
marketing period took place during February and March, 1964. 
This marketing period contained 24 shipments divided into 
six blocks of four shipments. 
T^he terminal markets will be referred to as A markets 
(Sioux City = A]_; Omaha = A?), the two carcass grade and yield 
buying plants as B markets TWaterloo =63; Des Moines = Ba, 
and the two live sort buying plants as C markets (Fort Dodge 
= C4Î Cedar Rapids = Cc). The four interior Iowa packing 
plants selected do buy hogs by other methods than those 
utilized. 
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Hypothesis 
The hypotheses tested were (1) there are no price dif­
ferences between hogs sold at the terminal markets and those 
sold at carcass grade and yield buying plants, (2) there are 
no price differences between hogs sold at terminal markets, 
carcass grade and yield buying markets and those sold to 
markets using live sort buying methods, (3) there are no price 
differences between hogs sold at the two terminal markets, 
(4) there are no price differences between hogs sold at the 
two carcass grade and yield buying markets, and (5) there are 
no price differences between hogs sold at the two live sort 
buying markets. Also, since there was a change in the general 
hog price level between the two marketing periods, a price 
responsiveness was determined for each market. Figure & 
illustrates the changing-price level found in this study. 
Hogs within a block or between shipments within a given 
block were assumed to be of the same quality, but not between 
blocks. Therefore, dummy variables had to be for each block 
of shipments to allow for hog price changes between blocks. 
Summary of the Analysis of the First Marketing Period 
The data were first analyzed in two separate parts. The 
analysis of the data from the first marketing period (using 
market weight price) is summarized below. (Page 143 and 
Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20 in Appendix A contain the ANOV, R^ , 
Figure Ô, Actual prices received compared with quoted prices 
(a) Average price of No, 1-3, 200-220 pound butchers 
at Sioux City and Omaha, No, 1-3, 220-220 
pound butchers. 
(b) Average interior Iowa and Southern Minnesota, 
No. 1-3, 200-220 pound butchers. 
Sioux City, Omaha (a ) 
6^-
Interior (b) 
êi4h 
(/> 
<134 
A Carcass Grade and Yield Price 
o Live Sort Price 
* Terminal Price 
Sioux City. Omaha (a) 
Interior (b) 
8/26 8(^ 99/3 9/4 9/9 9^ 16 2(27 3/2 3/5 3)9 3/12 3/18 
1963 1964 
->3 
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standard errors and other pertinent data for the first mar­
keting period, page 143 and Tables 21, 22, 23, and 24 for 
the second marketing period.) 
1) A price difference of 71 cents per hundred weight 
was found between the A and the C markets. This 
value was significant at the .01 level, 
2) A price difference of 50 cents per hundred weight 
was found between C and B markets, in favor of B 
market. The data were significant at the ,01 
level. 
3) A price difference of $1.21 per hundred weight was 
found between B and C markets, in favor of B mar­
ket. 
4) No significant price difference was found between 
the two A markets, or between the two B markets 
or between the two C markets. 
Summary of the Analysis of the Second Marketing Period 
1) No significant price difference was found between 
the A and C markets. 
2) A price difference of 36 cents per hundred weight 
was found between the B and C markets in favor of 
the B market. This was significant at ,05 level, 
with time trend significant at the .01 level. 
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3) No significant price difference was found between 
the two A markets. 
4) No significant price difference was found between 
the two B markets. 
5) A price difference of 62 cents per hundred weight 
was found between and markets, in favor of 
the Cj market. This datum was signigicant at the 
.01 level. 
Analysis of Combined Marketing Periods 
These results indicate that there were significant hog 
price differences between markets. And the greatest hog 
price differences were between the carcass grade and yield 
markets and the terminal markets. The results obtained from 
the marketing periods analyzed independently were not identi­
cal or consistent, therefore, the data were combined into a 
common analysis. The earlier analysis indicated that the 
greatest hog price differences were between terminal markets 
and carcass grade and yield markets. The analysis of the 
combined data was set up to specifically measure the dif­
ference between these two types of markets. 
The general multiple regression equation used to analyze 
the combined data is as follows: 
or l2 is function of X25 through Ï25» 3^5» 
X36, X37 or more specifically, selecting one dependent vari­
able. 
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X = a + + by(Xy) + bg(Xg) + bg(Xg) + b^ oi^ io) 
+ + ^ 12(^ 12) 1^3(^ 13) + 1^4^  ^14) 
|l| + + bi^ (X2^ ) + b^ ytX^ y) + b^ glX^ g) 
+ big(Xig) + b2o(X2o) 2^4^ 2^4^  + 2^5^ 2^5^  
+ ^ 35^ 3^5^  "*" 3^6^ 3^6^  "*" 3^7^ 3^7)* 
Dependent variables 
XjL = Market weight price per pound of hogs received at the 
market, less marketing cost (not including transporta­
tion costs) divided by the weight of the hogs at the 
market. 
X2 = Original weight price per pound of hogs received at the 
market, less marketing costs (not including transpor­
tation cost), divided by the weight of the hogs at the 
AEG farm before shipment. 
Independent variables 
The definition of independent variables is as follows: 
X5 through Xjj^  ^ = dummy variable used to account for the 
twelve blocks in which hogs were shipped on separate 
days. This variable was used to account for any price 
difference between blocks. The subscripts refer re­
spectively to X5 = first shipment or block, Xy = second 
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shipment or block, ." last shipment or block.^  
= variable used to determine the price difference between 
carcass grade and yield markets and terminal markets 
that is B (carcass grade and yield markets) = 1 and 
C (terminal markets) = -1. 
Xig = a variable for measuring the price difference between 
carcass grade and yield markets (B), terminal markets 
(A), and the live markets (C). That is, A (terminal 
markets) = 1, B (carcass grade and yield markets) = 1, 
C (live markets) = -2, 
Xi9 = a variable measuring the price difference between the 
two terminal markets. That is, A^  (Sioux City) = 1 
and A2 (Omaha) = -1. 
X20 ® a variable measuring the price difference between the 
. two carcass grade and yield markets. That is, B^  
(Waterloo) = 1, and B^  (Des Moines) = -1, 
X25 = a variable for measuring the price difference between 
the two live interior markets. That is, Cj^  (Fort Dodge) 
= 1, and (Cedar Rapids) = -1. 
I^n order to clarify exposition, the following defini­
tion of terms will be used during the remainder of this study. 
A block will refer to a group of shipments made on the same 
day. This refers (except one of two shipments) to four ship­
ments. These shipments were kept in individual lots on the 
farm prior to shipment and, as explained earlier, the ship­
ments within a block were as close to identical as practical. 
The composite price was discussed in an earlier section, page 
69. 
êo 
2^4 ~ ^  variable to measure the price difference between 
the average composite value or price of all shipments 
and the actual composite value of a particular ship­
ment, This variable measures the price difference be­
tween shipments within a block of four shipments, 
3^5 ~ variable X24 times this variable should indicate, 
if the composite value of shipment changes, how com­
posite value effects the returns from markets A and 
markets B. 
X36 = variable X2^  times X^ g, which measures how composite 
value affects the return from the markets, 
Ijy - variable ^ 21^  times X25 which measures the change in 
composite value affects the returns from markets 
and C^ , 
The factors b^ fX^ ) through were dummy vari­
ables for blocks since they do not contribute any to explan­
ation of the data other than the difference in price level 
between shipments, their values will not be included in the 
tables. 
Table 4 includes the values for X^ y, X^ g, X^ ,^ Xgg, 
X25, X24, X55, X35, and Xjj irrespective of the dependent 
variable used, the b values will be given for each re­
spective regression in later tables. 
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Table 4. Tabular values of X's for both and X2 de 
pendent variables 
Markets ^17 xlâ ^19 ^20 ^29 ^24 ^39 ^36 hi 
al 1 1 0 0 1 -D^ 0 
h 1 -1 0 0 1 -Da D^ 0 
h 1 1 0 1 0 1 D^ oa 0 
b6 1 1 0 -1 0 1 D® D* 0 
c4 0 -2 0 0 1 1 0 -2D^ D^ 
s 
0 -2 0 0 -1 1 0 -2D* -D* 
represents the difference between average composite 
value and actual composite value. 
The Analysis of the Combined Data Using 
Market Weight Price 
Various independent or explanatory variables were in­
cluded or excluded from the regressions to determine which 
were the most relevant to use when estimating hog price dif­
ferences or price responsiveness of markets. 
The regression developed using dependent X^  (market 
weight price) includes all the explanatory variables, equation 
(1), The b values which were significant at the ,01 level 
were b^ y, ^ 10» 2^5' ^ 36' ^ 37' ^ 35 significant at the 
2 
,05 level. The analysis of variance, R , and the standard 
error are contained in Table 5 and the b values and standard 
errors of b in Table 6, 
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2 Table 5. ANOV, R , F ratio and standard error for equation 
Source D.F. Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 20 0.004966 0.000248 
Residual 25 0.000128 • 0.000005 
Total 45 0.005094 
F ratio =48,3 Multiple R^  = 0.9747 
Standard Error 0.00226 
Table 6, Value of a, b values, standard errors of b for 
equation [1] 
a = $0.1510 per pound of hog 
b subscript designation b value Standard error of b 
6 0.0106 0.0076 
7 0.0046 0.0058 
8 0.0053 0.0054 
9 0.0040 0.0041 
10 0.0044 0.0034 
11 -0.0006 0.0023 
12 -0.0040 0.0041 
13 -0.0035 0.0038 
14 -0.0044 
-0.0028 
0.0053 
1? 0.0049 
16 -0.0068 a 
0.0030** 
0.0047 
17 0.0004 
18 0.0018** 0.0003 
19 -0.0000 0.0006 
20 0.0004 0.0006 
24 0.4157 0.4925 
25 -0.0040** 0.0006 
35 0.1160* 0.0495 
36 -0.0798** 0.0283 
37 0.2396** 0.0567 
I^n this table and hereafter all reference to sig 
nificant levels shall be indicated as follows: * sig­
nificant at .05 level and ** significant at ,01 level. 
Ô3 
The large obtained by using equation [l], means that 
when market weight price was used as dependent variable that 
most of the price variation between markets can be accounted 
for in the equation. Which means very little price vari­
ation was due to factors not included in the regression. The 
variable or factor accounts for the price trend over 
time or the change in composite value and was not signifi­
cant in equation [l]. The next step in the analysis was to 
drop it out of the equation. Thus equation [2]: 
= a + b^ (X^ ) + ••• + b2o(^ 20^  2^5^ 2^5^  
[2] 
Excluding ^ 24^ 2^4^  from the regression caused the fol­
lowing b values to become significant at the ,01 level, 
6^ *** bia, b2$, b36, b37. See Table Ô for the b values and 
standard errors of b for equation [2], The only significant 
b coefficients in equation [l] were b^ y, b^ g, bg^ , and 
b37 at the .01 level and b3g at the ,05 level (Table 6), 
The fact that the coefficients for block affect b^  through 
bi6 became significant indicates that if price level was 
not included in the analysis, price difference found between 
markets would be very small. However, it can be noted that 
the exclusion of the factor materially lower 
the r2 (see Table 7). 
Table 7. ANOV, R^ , F-ratio and standard error for equation 
f2] 
Source D.F. Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 19 
Residual 26 
Total 45 
F ratio = 51.3# 
Multiple R^  = 0.9740 
0.004962 
0.000132 
0.005094 
0.000261 
0.000005 
Standard error 0.00225 
Table Ô. Value of a, b values, standard errors of b for 
equation [2] 
a = $0,1510 per pound of hog 
Standard 
b subscript designation b value error of b 
6 0.0169** 0.0012 
7 0.0093** 0.0011 
8 0.0097** 0.0011 
9 0.0073** 0.0011 
10 0.0071** 0.0011 
11 o.oooa 0.0016 
12 -0.0073** 0.0011 
13 -0.0065** 0.0011 
14 -0.0087** 0.0011 
15 -0.0069** 0.0011 
16 -0.0107** 0.0011 
17 0.0031*» 0.0004 
18 0.0017** 0.0002 
19 -0.0000 0.0006 
20 0.0004 0.0006 
25 -0.0039** 0.0006 
35 0.1276»* 0.0473 
36 -0.0925** 0.0238 
37 0.2444** 0.0561 
â4b 
The next step taken in the analysis was to drop factors 
2^4^ 2^4^ » 3^5^ 3^5^ » 3^6^ 3^6^  from the original equation |l|. 
[3] = a + b5(X^ ) + •.. + b2o(X20) + ^ 25^ 2^5^  • 
These factors were dropped from the original equation to 
determine if the composite price variation within markets 
were small enough to exclude them from the regression. All 
of the b coefficients of equation [3] became significant at 
the .01 level except b^ , big, and b20> which were essentially 
the same as those found in equation [2] (see Table 9). The 
in the regression of equation [3] was reduced and the 
standard error increased from the preceding regression, hence 
not as good a fit (see Table 10). 
Continuing with the simplification of the regression, 
the factors b^ j(X^ )^, b^ y() were next excluded 
from the original regression. The reintroduced 
into the equation. These changes were made to find a better 
fit to the regression. The regression from equation [3] 
increased the to 0,92.59 but it also raised the standard 
error to 0,00315 (Table 11), The significant b coefficients 
were b^ y, b^ g, bg^ , and t>2^ , (Table 12). 
The final equation excluded all dummy variables 
b^ (][^ ) through b]^ (^X]^ )^ but includes all other variables. 
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Table 9. The value of a, b values, standard errors of b 
for equation [3] 
a = $0,1510 per pound of hog 
'iot designation b value 
Standard 
error of 
6 0,0167** 0.0017 
7 0,0087** 0.0017 
8 0,0109** 0.0017 
9 0,0077** 0.0017 
10 0.0072** 0.0017 
11 0.0005 0.0024 
12 -0.0078** 0.0017 
13 -0,0060** 0.0017 
14 -0,0090** 0.0017 
15 -0.0070** 0.0017 
16 -0.0113*» 0.0017 
17 0.0030** 0.0007 
18 0.0016** 0.0003 
19 -0.0024 0.0010 
20 0.0005 0.0010 
25 -0.0035** 0.0009 
Table 10, ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for 
equation [3] 
Source D,F, Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 16 0,004735 0,000295 
Residual 29 0,000359 0,00001 
Total 35 0,005094 
F ratio = 23.90 
Multiple R^  ® 0.9295 
Standard error 0,00351 
26 
Table 11, ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for 
equation [4] 
Source D.F, Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 17 0,0040 0,000315 
Residual 2Ô 0,OOO3 
Total 45 0.0051 
F ratio = 20,46 Standard error 0,00315 
Multiple R^  = 0,9452 
Table 12, The value of a, b values, standard errors of b 
for equation [4] 
a = $0.1510 per pound of hog 
b subscript designation b value standard error of b 
6 -0.0072 .0086 
7 -0.0092 .0065 
Ô -O.OO6O .0061 
9 -0.0051 ,004a 
10 -0.0033 ,0040 
11 -0.0046 ,0029 
12 0.0049 ,0048 
13 0,0056 .0044 
14 0,0074 .0060 
15 0,0077 .0057 
16 0,0037 .0055 
17 0,0027** .0006 
18 0,0020** .0004 
19 -0,0002 .0009 
20 0,0004 .0009 
24 1.5723* .5537 
25 -0.0042*» .0009 
a? 
- a +  ^^ 20^ 2^0^  
[4] 
"*• b2$(%2$) * 2^4^ 2^4^  * ^ 35^ 3^5^  "*• 3^6^ 3^6^  
•*• b^ yiX^ y). 
Table 13 and. Table 14 include the ANOV, R^ , standard 
error, b values and standard errors of b. 
The next step was to exclude X^ ,^ X^ y and to re­
tain X2^  to see if this equation would give any gain in 
fit. The following equations would be; 
The regression increasing the to 0,9452 but standard 
error was higher, (0,00315) than the regression which in­
cluded all factors, which had a standard error of 0,0022, 
(Tables 11 and 12). 
So, in the final regression all the dummy variables X^  
through Xi6 were excluded leaving the variables X^ y, X^ ,^ 
X19, X20, X25, X24, X35, X36, X^ y. The following would be 
the regression without the dummy variables, 
Xl = a + biy(Xiy) + big(Xig) + big(Xig) + t^ ofXgo) 
+ b2$(X2$) + b2/^ (X2/^ ) + bggfXgg) + b36(^ 36) * b3y(X3y), 
See Tables 13 and I4 for ANOV and b values. 
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Table 13. ÀNOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for 
equation [5J 
Source D.] P. Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 9 0.004a73 0.000541 
Residual 36 0.000221 0.000006 
Total 45 0.0005094 
F ratio = #3.3$ Standard error = 0.00247 
R2 = 0.9567 
Table 14. The value of a, b values, standard errors of b 
for equation [$] 
a = $0,1510 per pound of hog 
b subscriDt designation b value standard error of b 
17 0.0027** 0.0004 
la o.ooia** 0.0002 
19 -0.0001 0.0006 
20 0.0006 0.0006 
24 0.9453** 0.0374 
25 -0.0039** 0.0006 
35 0.0550 o.o4ao 
36 -o.oa39* 0.0252 
37 o.2oa6** 0.05a3 
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Final regression 
The regression of equation [$] did not give as good a 
fit as did the regression containing the variables for block 
effects. However, the simpler regression could be used to 
estimate price differences and price responses. Also, the 
inclusion of the composite price in the regression removes 
almost all of the block effects. 
Inserting the X values from Table 4 and the b values 
from Table 14 into equation [$] a price estimate can be made 
for each type of market. 
Where a = Mean of Market Weight Price 
D = Difference between composite value and 
average composite value of 46 shipments, 
A = Terminal Market Weight Price 
B = Rail Market Weight Price 
C = Live Market Weight Price 
[6] A = a + biylX^ y) + big(Xig) + * ^ 35^ 3^5^  
+ b36(%36)' 
The terms ^ 20(^ 20^  ^ 25^ 2^5^  dropped from 
equation [6j because the X values were zero for these terms, 
(Table 4). The term big(X2g) was excluded because the b 
coefficient (big) of that was not significant at the ,05 
level (Table 14). The nonsignificances of coefficient b^ g 
meant that there was no price difference between terminal 
90 
markets and Ag, Only one equation will be used for 
terminal markets, 
[7] B = a + + ^ 24^ 2^4^  
+ ^ >35(^ 35) + 3^6^ 3^6^ ' 
The terras b^ t^X^ g), ^ 25^ 2^5^ * ^ 37(237) were excluded 
from equation [?] because the X values were zero for these 
terms, (Table 4), The term b2o(%20) was excluded because 
the b coefficient (b^ o) of that factor was not significant at 
the ,05 level (Table 4). The nonsignificance of big meant 
that there was no price difference between the two carcass 
grade and yield markets, and B^ . Therefore, only one 
regression equation will be used for B markets. 
[Ô] C *= a + big(Xig) + ^ 25 ^ 2^5^  2^4^ 2^4) 
The terms biy(Xiy), biglX^ g), b2o(^ 2o) excluded 
from equation [Ô] because the X values for these factors were 
zero (Table i4), Separate regression equations were used 
for the two live sort markets, and C^ , because there was 
a significant difference between the C markets. Note the 
significance of b2$ at the ,01 level in Table 14. 
The following multiple regression equations were de­
veloped by substituting values from Tables 4 and I4 into the 
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equations 6, 7, and Ô respectively, 
A = 0.1510 + (0.0027)(-1) + (0.0018)(1) + (0.9453)(D) 
+ (0.0549)(D) + (-0.0039)(D) 
= 0.1501 + (0.8064)D 
B = 0.1510 + (0.0027)(1) + (0.0013)(1) + (0.9453)(D) 
+ (-0.0839)(D) 
= 0.1555 + (0.916L)D 
Since the coefficients for and are signifi­
cantly different; separate equations were developed 
C4 = 0.1510 + (Ô.00l8)(-2) + (-0.0039)(1) + (0.9453)(D) 
+ (-0.0839)(D)(-2D) + (0.2086)(D) 
= O.U35 = 1.3217 D 
C5 = 0.1510 + (0.0018) (-2) + (--0.0039) (-1) + (0.9453) (D) 
+ (-0.0839)(-2D) + (0.2086)(-D) 
= 0.1513 + 0.90&5 D 
i.e., 
[9] A = 0.1501 + (0.8064) D 
[10] B = 0.1555 + (0.9164) D 
[11] = 0.1435 + 1.3217 D 
[12] C5 = 0.1513 + (0.9045) D 
The first term in the above equations represents the 
market weight price at the mean composite value. The term 
(D) in the above equations represents the difference be­
tween the mean composite value of a given shipment and the 
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overall mean composite value. The terra drops out when the 
composite value equals $0,1427 per pound or D = 0, Thus at 
the mean (composite value) the difference between the value 
of hogs sold at B(carcass grade and yield) markets ($0,1555 
per pound) and terminal markets ($0.1501 per pound) was 
$0,0054 per pound or $0,54 per hundred weight. A value of 
$0.54 per hundred weight would make a 220 pound hog worth 
$1.19 more when sold on a carcass grade and yield market than 
when sold at a terminal market. 
The price difference between B(carcass grade and yield) 
markets and (Fort Dodge) at the mean was $1,20 per hun­
dred weight in favor of B, The price difference between B 
markets and Cg was $0.12 per hundred weight, in favor of B. 
The hog price difference between A markets and the 
market, at the mean, was $0,66 per hundred weight, in favor 
of A, The price difference between A markets and the 
market was $0.12 per hundred weight in favor of C^ . 
Plotting the regressions To plot the above regressions 
on a graph, one has a substitute different values for (D). 
Figure 9 illustrates these plotted regressions. The hori­
zontal scale represents the composite value and the vertical 
scale represents the predicted or expected market weight 
price. 
For example, if the composite value of a shipment were 
$0,1337 per pound, the price received for hogs sold at 
Figure 9. The price regressions at A, 
B, C4, and Cc markets (market 
weight analysis) 
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would be $13.15 per hundred weight, from $14.32 per hun­
dred weight, terminal markets A $14.30 per hundred weight, 
and from carcass grade and yield markets $14.72. The dif­
ferences found, at the mean composite value ($13.37 per hun­
dred weight), were as follows: 
B - A = $0.42 per cwt. 
B - = $1.57 per cwt. 
B - Cg = $0.40 per cwt. 
A - C/j, = $1.15 per cwt. 
C5 - A = $0.02 per cwt. 
C5 - = $1.17 per cwt. 
If the composite value of a shipment was increased to 
$14.47 per hundred weight the following difference in ex­
pected market weight prices would occur. 
B ($16.65 per cwt. ) - A ($15.97 per cwt. = $0.70 per cwt 
B " » n - C4($15.97 It If = $0.78 tt It 
B " ti tt - C5($16.07 It It = $0.53 tt It 
A ($15.97 tr It ) - C4($15.97 It If = $0.00 II It 
C5($16.07 It It ) - A ($15.97 It II = $0.10 It It 
C^ ( " It It ) 
- C4($15.97 It II = $0.10 tt It 
One can observe both from the above equations and the 
regressions in Figure 8, that the market was the most price 
responsive. Its market price increased $1.32 per hundred 
weight for each $1,00 increase in composite value. The ter­
minal markets A were the least responsive, they increased 
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only $0.81 per hundred weight for each $1.00 per hundred in­
crease in composite value. The market increased market 
prices $0.90 per hundred weight for each $1.00 increase in 
composite shipment value. The carcass grade and yield mar­
kets increased $0.92 per hundred weight for each $1.00 in­
crease in composite value. 
Even though the market was the most responsive to 
changing composite value, it was only at a relatively high 
composite value (i.e., $15.47 per hundred weight) that the 
market price approached the prices paid at other mar­
kets.^  
Figures 10 through 13 contain the regressions with mar­
ket weight prices received plotted against actual composite 
O^bservation of market prices of hogs received at 
helps provide the primary reason for to be significantly 
different from O5, C4 practiced heavy price discrimination 
against light hogs during the second marketing period, but 
did not discriminate very much during the first marketing 
period. However, prices during the first period were higher 
and hog supplies were somewhat smaller, making it more diffi­
cult to obtain sufficient supplies of hogs. But did dis­
criminate heavily those hogs weighing under 190 pounds during 
the second marketing period. It could not be determined ex­
actly why Ca reduced prices when the other markets did not. 
Apparently, had little use for light hogs and was trying 
to discourage their shipment. The unexplained heavy dis­
crimination of certain types of hogs does create one of the 
uncertainties producers must contend with when marketing hogs. 
%ey must be able to learn and detect when markets are not 
pricing hogs competitively. Producers that recognize this 
can shift their hog sales to higher paying markets. Just be­
cause was not price competitive with the other markets 
when buying on a live basis does not mean they are not com­
petitive when buying by other methods, does buy hogs on 
a carcass grade and yield basis. 
Figure 10, Market A price regression and 
actual prices plotted against 
composite value 
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Figure 11. Market B price regression and 
actual prices plotted against 
composite value 
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Figure 12. Market price regression and 
actual prices plotted against 
composite value 
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Figure 13. Market C5 price regression and 
actual prices plotted against 
composite value 
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values. Figure 10, terminal markets, Figure 11, carcass 
grade and yield markets. Figure 12, live interior market C^ , 
and Figure 13, live interior market C^ . 
A second dependent variable (X^ ) regressed against 
the same independent variables as was Xj^ . Dependent vari­
ables X2 represents the price per pound based on the original 
weight of the hogs. 
As mentioned earlier, the use of market weight price in 
determining price per pound differences between markets makes 
the implied assumption that the hogs were not shipped but 
were located on each particular market for which prices were 
recorded. 
If a producer were to use data from this study, he would 
have to estimate the transportation cost and shrink loss from 
his farm to a particular market. The transportation charge 
and shrink loss would have to be deducted, which would give 
him a lower return than that found in this study. The more 
distant a producer was from the market, the larger the de­
duction. A producer must note marketing charges, they have 
already been deducted. Any change in marketing charges, by 
the terminal markets, would have to be included in the esti­
mation of final net price. 
106 
Analysis Using Original Weight Price 
Terminal markets may feel that this study was biased 
against them. Most terminal markets feed their hogs prior to 
sale, while other markets do not. Therefore, an analysis 
based on market weight price would not measure the additional 
weight hogs had gained on their market. Terminal markets 
may contend that any price advantage other markets have would 
be offset by smaller market weight of the hogs. 
Hogs actually lose some weight while being transported 
to market. Based on previous research, most of the weight 
lost during shipment was fill loss rather than tissue shrink. 
Therefore, only if the hogs were shipped extremely long dis­
tances would any tissue shrink take place. Fill loss does 
not reduce the hog cut out value, but it does reduce the 
weight of the hog. Terminal markets claim, that even though 
hogs lose weight during transit to their markets, the feed 
they provide regains a considerable portion of the intrasit 
weight loss (29). 
Assuming the preceding statement was correct, then ter­
minal markets would be discriminated against when they are 
compared with other markets on a market weight price basis. 
The data were reanalyzed using original weight price as 
the dependent variable. An analysis using original weight 
price should give those markets that were nearest to the AEG 
farm and those that fed hogs at the market an advantage. 
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Those markets which hogs were shipped the furtherest distance 
and did not feed should be the lowest priced markets. There­
fore, Xg was substituted for X2 in equation [5] and regressed 
against the independent variables. 
Xg = a + biy(Xiy) + bi^ (XjLg) + biçlX^ )^ + b2o(X2o) 
fl3j + ^ 24^ 2^4^  2^5^ 2^5^  3^5^ 3^5^  
+ b^ afX^ )^ + 
Table 15 contains the ANOV, standard error and F 
ratio of this regression and Table 16 contains the values of 
the b coefficients and standard errors of b. 
Although the (0,9479) from equation [13J is not as 
large as that found in equation [$], R^  = 0.9567, the dif­
ference is not great. 
Table 15, ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for 
equation [13] 
Source D.F. Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 9 0.00593 0.00065# 
Residual 36 O.OOO32 0.000009 
Total 45 O.OO625O 
F ratio = 72.89 
Multiple R^  = 0.9479 
Standard error = O.OO3O 
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Table 16, The value of a, b values, standard erros of b 
for equation [13J 
a = $0,1461 per pound of hog 
b subscript designation b value Standard error of b 
17 0.0039 * 0,0006 
18 0,0016** 0.0003 
19 - 0,0008 
20 0.0008 0.0008 
24 1.0443** 0.0454 
25 -0,0036 •» 0.0008 
35 0,1099 0.0583 
36 -0,0681 * O.O3O6 
37 0.2776* 0,0708 
The X values are located in Table 4» they are the same 
values as those used for X^ . 
All b's were significant at the ,01 level except big, 
b20, b^ j, b35 but b^ g is significant at the ,05 level and 
3^5 approaches it. The data of this regression also indi­
cated bgo and bi9 not significant that there was no signifi­
cant difference between the two B markets and between the two 
A markets. Even though the standard errors for both b^  ^and 
B35 were relatively large, they were used to develop the 
regression equation for A, B, and C5 markets, 
a = 0,1460 
D = Difference between average composite value and 
composite value 
A = 0,1460 + (0.0039)(-1) + (0,0016)(1) + (1,0443)(0) 
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+ (0.1099)(-D) + (-0.0681)(D) + 
= 0.1437 + 0.8663 D 
B = 0.1460 + (0.0039)(1) + (0.0016)(1) + (1.0443)(D) 
+ (-0.0681)(D) 
= 0.1515 + (1.0861) D 
c4 = 0.1460 + (0.0016)(-2) + (-0.0036)(1) 
+ (1.0443)(D) + (-0.0681)(-2d) + (0.2776)(D) 
= 0.1392 + 1.4580 D 
C5 » 0.1460 + (0.0016)(-2) + (-0.0036)(-l) 
+ (1.0443)(D) + (-0.0681)(-2d) + (0.2776)(-D) 
= 0.1464 + (0.9029) D 
Collecting terms, equations [i4], [15], [i6], and [17] were 
developed. 
[14] A = 0.1437 + 0.8663 D 
[15] B = 0.1515 + 1.0861 D 
[16] C4 = 0.1392 + 1.4580 D 
[17] C5 = 0.1464 + 0.9029 D 
The terminal market prices found using the %2 dependent 
variable were compared with those found using the vari­
able, because the earlier analysis might have disadvantaged 
it most. 
The difference between markets A and markets B (i.^ ., 
equation [I5] — equation [I4]) at the mean composite value 
(i.e., D = 0; thus second term drops out) was (O.i5i5 -
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0,1437) $0.7# per hundred weight in favor of the B markets. 
Whereas the regression using equation [$] the difference 
was only |0.54 per hundred weight between these two markets, 
in favor of the B market. This means, that when using the 
original weight price, the terminals appeared lower priced 
than they did when using the market weight price in the 
analysis. However, the B markets are located closer to the 
Bisland farm, therefore, hogs shipped to the B markets 
presumably would not have lost as much weight as would the 
hogs shipped to the terminal markets, A better comparison 
might have been made with the market, it was located 120 
miles from the farm and Aj^  was 169 miles and A2 was I4Ô 
miles. Therefore, the difference between the distances was 
not great enough to provide much different shrink loss. The 
comparison of A markets with might indicate more exactly 
if the A markets were discriminated against in the earlier 
analysis. The price difference between A and Cg, using 
variable X2 (equation [17]) -- equation [IÔ] ) was $0,27 per 
hundred weight in favor of C^ , but when using variable X^ , 
the difference was only $0,12 per hundred weight in favor of 
the Cj market. 
One can conclude from this that the terminals were not 
put at a disadvantage because of greater weight sold or 
shrink. The analysis using market weight price makes ter­
minals appear more favorable than they do using the original 
weight price analysis. 
Ill 
Plotting the regressions 
Values were substituted for (D) in the equations [14], 
[15], [16], and [17] to plot the regressions for each of the 
markets. Figure I4 shows these regressions. 
All of the markets were more responsive, except C^ , to 
changing composite prices using the X2 variable than they 
were when using All of the mean prices of the markets 
were lower using the I2 variable than they were with Xj, 
This could be expected because all hogs (except two ship­
ments) lost weight during shipment between the time they 
were weighed and the time they were sold. 
The preceding analysis indicated that terminal markets 
were not disadvantaged by the analysis using market wei^ t 
price as a value factor. The X2 variable was regressed the 
same independent variables as were the results, in all cases, 
were essentially the same as compared above. The analysis 
using Xg variable will not be discussed further as its 
ceofficients were affected by the variable loss or gain in 
wei^ t that occurred during transit and prior to shipment to 
a market. 
Composite prices 
Before proceeding further with the analysis, it might be 
helpful to clear up some points. The various market price 
responses to changing composite values (using market weight 
Figure I4. The price regressions at A, B, 
C4, and C5 (original weight 
analysis) 
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price) have, with the exception of market C^ , been less than 
1,0. That is, the second factor in the regression equations 
(i.e., A = 0,1501 + O.ÔO64D) ,0064 is less than 1,0, What 
type of response should be expected? To determine the proper 
response, it will be important to determine what conditions 
are necessary to obtain a 1,0 response, 
(1) There was no quality evaluation of these hogs, 
neither during the first or second marketing period. If 
there were different qualities of hogs (in total) between the 
first and second marketing period, how would this affect the 
response curves? (a) If the quality of hogs were higher 
during the first marketing or observation period, one would 
expect the response curve to be less than 1,0 (if 1,0 is con­
sidered to be the response when there is equal quality 
throughout the study), (b) If the hog quality was higher 
during the second marketing period, one would expect the re­
sponse curves to be less than 1,0, 
Quite often, especially when hogs are purchased live, 
buyers use weight as one measure of quality. The mean weight 
of the hogs for the first period was 204,4 pounds per hog 
and during the second period it was 197,5 pounds per hog. 
If there were some tendency to judge quality by weight, then 
the quality as assessed by the market personnel would be 
less for the second marketing period, how much less cannot 
be established. Thus, if the quality of hog were lower 
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during the second period, it would give some reason to expect 
a response of less than 1,0, 
(2) In order to expect a 1,0 response, the markets, 
which were averaged to determine the composite value, must 
be competitors with those markets to which hogs were sold. 
If the markets were not pure competitors, then the response 
curve can depart from the expected 1,0, Also, the markets 
must be equally competitive at all price and supply ranges. 
For example, one might argue that the reason market has a 
greater than 1,0 response (1,3217) was the supply of hogs 
was large (such as was the case during the second marketing 
period, when prices were lower) enough that it did not have 
to be competitive to obtain hogs. One might reason that be- . 
cause of some certain Ideational advantages, received 
sufficient supplies from around their plant, without affecting 
their competitors supply. But, during shorter supply periods 
(such as during the first marketing period) had to be more 
competitive to obtain enough hogs to maintain current pro­
cessing requirements, 
(3) Another factor which must exist to have a 1,0 re­
sponse is that market price quotations (which were used to 
make up the composite price) must be equal to the actual 
prices paid on the market. 
What relationship does the composite value of a shipment 
have to actual prices received by farmers? Does it represent 
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changing prices? Could one assume that as composite prices 
increase, prices on the market increase? 
To a limited extent this was true, but one cannot know 
what the ideal response should be, this would be possible 
only if there were one market which reflected accurately, at 
all times, the changing demand and supply relationship of 
pork and other meat commodities. It would have.to be a 
market that would completely fit the pure competitive market 
framework. It would be a firm that had complete knowledge 
of the market but was not large enough to influence market 
prices. It could not have any locational advantage, clearly, 
there is no one market which has all these characteristics. 
Most packing plants approach this ideal to a large degree, 
but the departations from it are sufficient to prevent the 
selection of one. Therefore, only the relativeness of the 
response to changing composite values or prices could be 
examined, and the statement earlier made that as composite 
values increase, market prices also increase. 
Analysis of Weight Loss to Market 
The data obtained from this study were in a form that 
it could be used to estimate weight loss during shipment to 
market. Therefore, an attempt was made to analyze weight 
loss. Analysis of weight loss could support or refute the 
analysis made using the X2 variable data when it was compared 
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to the variable data. The hogs, in this study, originated 
from the ISU farm at Madrid, Iowa. The distance from the 
farm to each market was different, they are as follows: 
A]_ = 169 miles, A2 = 14^  miles, = 31 miles, = 37 miles 
(to the point where the hogs were weighed), = 70 miles, 
Cj = 120 miles. 
There are many factors which affect weight loss during 
shipment to market. Some of these factors are: Distance 
from the market, temperature during shipment, weather con­
ditions, type of hogs and method of handling during loading. 
Previous studies have found it difficult to isolate the 
relevant variables. Even if each factor could be isolated, 
this would not account for the influence each factor has on 
other factors. Studying each factor separately would not be 
very beneficial. During this study, the hogs were sorted 
into four separate lots so that each lot had an equal number 
of hogs in each weight group. The hogs were weighed prior 
to movement into the holding pens, therefore, weights were 
not taken at the time of shipment, but during the sorting 
process. Some hogs were held in the holding pens for over a 
weekend, causing some change in weight of the lot prior to 
shipment.^  But, each lot within a block had an equal number 
A^n attempt was made to obtain the weight of a lot just 
prior to shipment. The trucks, prior to loading and just af­
ter loading, were weighed at the closest truck scale, near the 
farm. But due to the difficulty in controlling various fac­
tors, which affect truck weights such as collection of mud, 
snow, and gasoline fill of the truck, this procedure was 
dropped. 
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of hogs held between weighing and shipment. 
The method of weighing made it impossible to determine 
weight loss during shipment. Weight loss during shipment 
would be valuable information to producers shipping hogs. 
However, the analysis of the weight data in this study could 
be used to determine weight loss between markets. That is, 
one can compare how much more weight was lost at the more 
distant markets than was lot at the nearer markets. 
The method of analyzing this data was the same as that 
used when price difference was analyzed. Average shrink 
loss between markets indicated as high as 2 percent greater 
shrink loss to some markets, but the regression analysis 
could find no significant difference in weight loss between 
markets either at the .01 or ,05 level. Summary data for 
shrink analysis are contained in Appendix B, Tables 25 and 
26. 
The shrink study had some definite limitations but it 
did control more factors than most previous studies, yet, 
there was sufficient variation in weight loss within ship­
ments to a given market to render the data statistically 
nonsignificant. If one had been able to isolate more fac­
tors such as temperature during shipment and time in transit, 
it might have b*en possible to obtain meaningful results. 
The results of the weight loss analysis supports that 
found when comparing the ^^ d X2 variable data. Had a 
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significant intransit weight loss been found, the analysis 
using the Xg variable would have been more valid than using 
the Xj variable. 
The data derived from using the Xj_ dependent variable 
(market weight price) seem the most valid when used in 
comparing markets and marketing methods. Since any study 
of this type has some limitations, the summary and con­
clusion chapter will explore the implications and the 
limitations of the data. But, the data clearly reject the 
first hypothesis set down, that of no price difference be­
tween methods of marketing and markets. Clearly, on the 
basis of this study, the grade and yield method of selling 
would return the producer the greatest net dollars for his 
hogs. 
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SUIvmRY AND CONCLUSIONS 
One cannot assume that the hog price differentials 
found between markets, in this study, can apply identically 
to all similar Iowa markets. Some of the factors affecting 
a particular market are peculiar to only that market. Any 
generalization made about expected prices at specific markets 
would be extremely tenuous, 
A hypothesis generally made by marketing research workers 
and marketing economists is that the transportation cost, 
between one central terminal market and another, would ac­
count for most of the price differences. That is, the price 
difference between terminal markets could not be any larger 
than the costs of transporting hogs from one market to the 
other. In this study, two central markets, Sioux City (A^ ) 
and Omaha (A^ ) were compared to determine the price difference 
between_them. One would assume, as stated above, that there 
should be no difference between them. Temporarily the price 
at one market could be above another but no higher than the 
cost of transporting hogs from one market to another. Over 
the long run, the market prices of the two should be equal. 
There are some basic factors which cause these two mar­
kets to have identical or nearly identical prices: 
1, The terminal markets are an integral part of the 
national market. 
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2. The concentration of hog producers around each 
market are approximately the same. 
3. The number of packers buying on each terminal are 
practically the same. 
4. Many of the packer buyers patronize both markets. 
5. The method of pricing the hogs is the same for 
both markets, they both use private treaty, 
6. The feeding and weighing on each market is similar. 
7. The government reporters collect prices and sup­
plies of hogs for both markets and relay the in­
formation to the news media, (i.e.., radio, tele­
vision and newspaper). 
The data obtained from this research study supports the 
general hypothesis stated earlier; there was no significant 
price difference between the two terminal markets. 
Another type or method of marketing used in this study 
was interior packing plants buying hogs on a carcass grade 
and yield basis. These plants are located at Waterloo (B3) 
and Des Moines (B^ ). 
There was found in this study no significant price dif­
ference between the two carcass grade and yield buying plants. 
One might raise the question, "Is there any reason to 
expect that the prices paid for hogs by these markets should 
be similar?" Most packing plants, buying on a carcass grade 
and yield method use wholesale prices to determine the value 
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of hogs purchased. A packer estimates the yield of saleable 
meat from prior experience gained by breaking hog carcasses 
down and multiples this by the wholesale price. Therefore, if 
the yield estimations are similar, the prices paid should 
be similar. One can easily recognize that the only variable 
in estimating value is yield estimation, because wholesale 
prices are reported daily and available to the entire meat 
trade. The data obtained from this study is consistant with 
the results one would expect. 
The other type of hog buying method and/or market ex­
amined in this study was direct packer purchases by live 
evaluation. The two packing plants used for this analysis 
were located at Fort Dodge (C^ ) and Cedar Rapids (C^ ). These 
two buying firms did not pay identical prices, that is a 
price difference was found between these two plants. There 
are many reasons why the prices were not similar. 
The essential reasons why packing plants may not pay 
identical prices were discussed in the theory chapter and 
will not be examined fully in this chapter. 
The data obtained for this study could also be used to 
determine price responsiveness of markets, as well as price 
differences. 
Price Differences Between Markets 
The average price differences found between similar 
markets are as follows (using market weight price): 
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Al - Ag = $0.1501 - $0.1501 = 0 
B3 - = $0.1555 - $0.1555 = 0 
- C5 = $0.1435 " $0,1513 = -$0.007â/pound of hog 
or $0.78/cwt. 
As mentioned earlier there were price differences found 
between types of markets and/or different methods of buying 
hogs. The average price differences found between methods of 
marketing and/or markets are as follows; 
A - B = $0.1501 - $0.1555 = -$0.0054/pound per hog 
or - $0,54/cwt. 
A - = $0.1501 - $0.1435 = $0.0066/pound of hog 
or $0.66/cwt. 
A - C5 = $0.1501 - $0.1513 = -$0.0012/pound of hog 
or - $0,12/cwt. 
B - = $0.1555 - $0.1435 = $0.0120/pound of hog 
or $1.20/cwt. 
B - C5 = $0.1555 - $0.1513 = $0.0042/pound of hog 
or $0,42/cwt. 
The B markets or carcass grade and yield buying markets 
clearly paid more for hogs than did the other markets. Pro­
ducers marketing their hogs at B type markets could gain an 
additional $0.54 for each hundred pounds of hogs sold. 
Price Responses 
In addition to obtaining the preceding data, data were 
obtained on the price responsiveness of markets. The price 
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responsiveness of markets might provide producers with addi­
tional knowledge to assist them in selecting a particular 
market. The method used to determine price response was to 
compare composite prices with actual prices received. The 
price responses found for each market are as follows: 
Where D = Difference between the average composite of 
the total markets and the composite price of 
a particular shipment. 
A = (0.1501) + (0.â064){D) 
B = (0.1555) + {0.9164)(D) 
= (0.1435) + (1.3217)(D) 
C5 = (O.i513) + (0.9045)(D) 
The last terms in the above equations indicate the price 
responsiveness of a market. 
The most responsive market was (1.3217), the least 
responsive was A (0,8064). Although the B market was not the 
most price responsive (0.9164) its response was fairly high. 
Despite the fact that B's price response was lower, its general 
price level was well above the prices of the other markets. 
Only at extremely high hog price levels did pay more for 
hogs, than did the A, B or markets. 
As discussed in the analysis chapter, there was no re­
sponse difference between and B^  or A^  and A2, but there 
was a response difference between and (both purchased 
hogs on a live basis). Why was more price responsive 
125 
than C^ ? 
One obvious reason must be that the factors affecting 
these two markets, when buying hogs, are not identical. 
Some of the factors affecting packing plants buying prices 
were discussed in the theory chapter, but additional factors 
will be examined in this chapter. 
Live hog market prices are derived from retail prices 
through the wholesaler and finally through the packing plants. 
Live prices are a reflection of consumer demand for pork and 
all live prices must be a reflection of t his demand, A local 
live market is a part of the national market. Just because 
a local market is interrelated with the national market does 
not preclude that all local markets must have identical 
prices. Each packing plant (local market) has some of the 
features peculiar to oligopsonies or monopsonies. A market 
containing these features could have prices which depart from 
the national market derived prices. 
It would appear that has a peculiar supply situa­
tion, one that is different from the other markets, because 
its price patterns were considerably different than the 
prices of the other markets. C^ 's prices were not only 
more responsive, but the price level of except for 
extremely high composite prices, was consistently below 
the price level of most other markets. When the general 
price level was low (i.e., supply relatively larger) C^ 's 
price discounts on light hogs were much larger than the other 
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markets. Apparently did not want these lighter hogs and 
did not feel that the heavy discounting would affect their 
total receipts. When the supplies of hogs were large 
(i.e,., prices lower), did not apply a large price dis­
count on the light hogs. At this level of supply, 
prices were very close to the prices of other markets. 
The examination of G^ 's reaction, however, should not 
ignore the fact that does buy hogs by other methods. 
Packers also purchase hogs using carcass grade and yield for 
evaluation. It may be that does not have identical re­
sponse curves with all buying methods. 
The Cj market was not as price responsive as was C^ , 
Although C5 did change prices as supplies changed, it did 
not change prices as rapidly as did C^ , What might be the 
factors which contribute to the different price reactions 
of these two markets? 
Gg's only method of purchasing hogs was live evalua­
tions of the hogs. This may partially explain Cj's pricing 
policy during supply or general price level changes. Since 
C5 used only one method of buying, C^ 's hog buying personnel 
might have felt drastic price changes would reduce receipts, 
on the other hand, might have felt they were forced to be 
competitive when buying on carcass basis (because the larger, 
more knowledgeable producers sell hogs this way), but not for 
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the live evaluated hogs. They could offset the higher prices 
paid on hogs bought by the carcass basis with the hogs bought 
on a live basis. If the two buying methods used by could 
have been combined, the response of might have been very 
similar to the other markets, and C^ 's individual or 
peculiar supply area might have caused the price pattern 
discrepancy between these two markets. If this were true, it 
would seem that Gg has more competitors (competitors for pur­
chasing hogs) at all supply levels than does C^ , would 
not have the locational advantage that enjoys. The pro­
ducers located around C^ 's plant must be attracted to that 
plant for reasons other than price, or it might be that C^ 's 
local producers are not aware of the available market alter­
natives, However, it does not appear reasonable that the 
bulk of the producers surrounding should be any less aware 
of other market alternatives than are the producers. 
What previous theory would adequately explain why the 
terminals or A markets are the least responsive to price 
change? Normally, one would expect those markets with the 
most monopsonistic or oligopsonistic features to-be the mar­
kets which respond the least. The terminal markets or the 
packing plants buying on the terminal markets do not seem to 
possess the necessary criteria to have more monopsony or 
oligopsony features than packing plants located off the 
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central terminal market,^  It could be as some people have 
maintained, that the function previously played by terminal 
markets has declined to a point where only surplus hogs are 
shipped to these markets. That is, hogs not needed by the 
interior packers are shipped to the terminal markets. If 
this were true, it would mean that when hog supplies were 
low, terminal markets would not be bidding competitively for 
hogs, but during larger supply periods, they would appear 
relatively more aggressive. What the preceding hypothesis 
implied was that packers who buy on the terminal markets do 
not adjust hog prices as much as other packing plants. When 
prices rise too high, they refrain from bidding and after the 
price level lowers, they move back into the market. 
However, it must be made clear that packing plants pur­
chasing hogs on the terminal markets pay greater prices than 
W^hen reference is made to packing plants, it is not 
meant to exclude terminal yards, rather terminal yards are 
included. The prices paid for hogs at the terminal markets 
are the result of packing plants buying on that market. If 
terminal yards do not pay competitive prices, it is because 
those plants buying on the terminal markets cannot or do not 
desire to compete with the packing plants not buying on the 
terminal yards. The terminal yards are not a buying agency, 
they do not determine competition, they simply provide a 
mechanism that is designed to implement competition. It is 
those packing plants who buy on that market determine the 
price. 
It is true that any packing plant can purchase live­
stock on the terminal markets, but once interior packing 
plants have hired buyers and have supplied them with proper 
buying equipment (cars, radios, etc.) they have to compare 
the marginal cost of procuring livestock locally with the 
cost of obtaining them from the terminal yards. (Cont, next 
page) 
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those recorded in the study. In order to derive the pro­
ducers net price, it was necessary to deduct the marketing 
charges assessed by the terminal marketing agencies from the 
gross price. However, packing plants, buying hogs at the 
terminal market, must pay full price for their hogs at prices 
which include marketing charges. The average marketing 
charge for all the hogs marketed in this study was 50 cents 
per hundred pounds of live hog. If this marketing charge is 
added to the terminal market price as shown in Figure â, one 
readily can see even at the lowest level of prices, the price 
paid by packers purchasing at the terminal yards was more 
than that paid by packers buying under the rail grade system. 
At the mean composite price, the price paid for hogs by 
packing plants buying at the terminal yards was $15.50 per 
hundred pounds. Whereas the carcass grade and yield buying 
(Footnote continued) Procuring livestock by packers on the 
terminal market does incur some costs such as putting a buyer 
on that market as well as the cost of transporting the hogs 
from the terminal market to the packing plant. If the dis­
tance from the terminal market to the packing plant is large, 
the transportation and weight loss costs can be an important 
factor. The packer might be able to pay locally 20 to 50 
cents over the terminal market price to procure sufficient 
supplies, and still be economically sound. Some of the 
direct procurement of hogs by packing plants is done by inde­
pendent buyers hired on a commission basis. 
This portion of a packers buying operation is completely 
flexible, the plants incur no operating losses when not pur­
chasing through these sources. So with this type of buying 
operation, the packer can choose the most economical method 
of buying his hogs without having to account for fixed costs. 
130 
firms paid $15.55 per hundred pounds, only ,05 per hundred 
pounds higher. These figures point out very clearly why 
terminal located packing plants have had trouble surviving. 
They have not only been forced to pay competitive prices but 
many of the terminal located plants are older and more out-
of-date plants. The irony of this situation is that farmers 
receive less from hogs sold at terminal markets not only but 
that packers who are obtaining supplies from terminal markets 
are paying competitive prices. The lower price received by 
farmers from terminal market sold hogs has led many farmers 
away from the terminal markets and has reduced the supply of 
hogs available to the terminal based plant, causing per unit 
operating costs to rise. 
Reasons for Price Differences 
This study does not have sufficient data to determine 
the basic causes of the various market price levels. It was 
designed only to measure the price differentials between 
markets. 
The fact that the carcass grade and yield market 
prices are from (the relevant range used in this study) 4O to 
45 cents per hundred pounds above the C^ , the next highest 
market, and from 4O to 65 cents per hundred pounds above the 
terminal market raises one specific question, Why do packers, 
when buying on a carcass basis, pay higher prices for hogs 
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than when using other methods of purchasing? The following 
list contains some of the possible reasons for the price 
discrepencies. 
1. Packers are unaware that they are paying more when 
they are purchasing hogs by the carcass. 
2. The total number of hogs purchased by the grade and 
yield method is only a small proportion of the total 
hogs purchased, so packers can justify the higher 
price by charging the cost off to public relations 
or good will. 
3. The cost of procurement using the other buying 
methods is higher so that it is economically 
feasible to pay higher prices in order to elimi­
nate buying costs. 
4. The reason given by most packing plants for paying 
higher for hogs bought on a carcass basis is that 
the packer can pay more because uncertainty is 
eliminated. Packing plant personnel say the packer 
is able to estimate the value of meat purchased 
from producers. Most marketing studies on buying 
methods indicate that grade and yield evaluation 
is more accurate than live evaluation (11). 
Many packers contend that the higher value paid for car­
cass graded animals can be justified because carcass buying 
reduces uncertainty in estimating the true value of the 
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animal. There may be a few individual cases where this is 
true, especially for small packing plants, where the numbers 
of hogs purchased are small. The author's contention however 
is that it does not apply to relatively large packing plants 
such as those used in this study. The number of hogs handled 
by these larger packing plants can amount to over 2,000 hogs 
a day, or over 600,000 hogs a year. The uncertainty created 
by estimating yields from the live hog would be very small, 
with larger numbers of hogs purchased. Probability values can 
be established on yields of meat from hogs and accurate esti­
mations of yields frpm a live evaluation can be made. Any 
purported uncertainty to which a probability can be estimated 
is no longer a uncertainty. 
Another factor which eliminates some of the uncertainty 
when buying hogs, via the carcass grade and-yield method, is 
that when a packer uses this method, the packer does not have 
to assume any loss due to condemnation, although in many cases 
packers do assume part of the loss. If the animal, or a 
portion of the carcass, is deemed unfit for human consumption, 
the producer assumes the loss because the value of a hog is 
determined by the estimated yield of meat from the carcass as 
it hangs in the cooler. But again, with large numbers of 
hogs handled probabilities can be attached to the loss and 
thereby accounted for by reducing price. 
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The limitations of this study or any study, which at­
tempts to determine the price patterns of an industry, is 
that once price inconsistencies are discovered, the industry, 
in this case packing plants, can be expected to move immedi­
ately to correct the price inconsistencies. 
If producers are convinced, from this study, that they 
will receive higher net returns by selling their hogs the 
carcass method, packing firms aware of this will adjust their 
carcass prices lower. Packing plants can accomplish the ad­
justment by either increasing their processing charge or 
lowering prices. However, if there is an economically sound 
reason for packing plants to have different prices for dif­
ferent methods_of buying, then all packing firms will have to 
adjust their buying prices 40 to 60 cents per cwt, upward to 
those found using the carcass method. If carcass buying 
packing plants used in this study included all their costs 
when deducting processing charges, then carcass buying is 
the most accurate method of determining the derived live hog 
prices. All other methods of buying, unless drastically 
revised, will be obsolete and those packing plants without 
carcass buying, or an equivalent live buying price, will be 
unable to procure sufficient hogs to maintain necessary plant 
volume. The inefficiencies in the other systems of buying 
will have to be eliminated. The change will come about only 
if producers react to this new knowledge. Until the results 
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obtained from this study and others are acted upon by producers 
the familiar marketing patterns will continue to exist for a 
considerable time. 
If the grade and yield buying price does not represent 
the true competitive situation, packing plants will quickly 
adjust carcass grade and yield buying prices lower before they 
are forced out of business due to losses incurred from over­
pricing their raw product. 
If the rail grade or carcass grade and yield price re­
presents the true competitive hog price, then Iowa hog pro­
ducers could annually increase their income by $18 million 
by using this method of marketing, ceteris paribus. Iowa 
producers annually sell over 4.5 billion pounds of live pork. 
They could obtain a net gain of 40 cents per hundred pounds 
by selling carcass grade and yield, assuming there is no ad­
ditional transportation cost and that all Iowa grade and yield 
buying plants would pay the same price as those found in this 
study. 
Further Research 
Additional hog price studies should be made using the 
design and method of analysis developed for this study. A 
study should be made comparing a larger number of packing 
plants using the carcass grade and yield method of buying. 
Even though this study showed no statistical difference be­
tween two packing plants buying on a carcass basis, it does 
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not necessarily prove that there is no difference between 
each and every plant using the carcass method of buying. One 
can generalize about price differences from this study, but 
the generalizations may not be accurate in all cases. Each 
packing plant has its own method of estimating yield; There­
fore, the variation in yield estimation between plants might 
be large enough to create a hog price difference between 
carcass buying markets. 
A study should be made to determine if there are any 
price differences between methods of buying when the grades 
of hogs are different. A widely accepted theory by marketing 
economists is that terminal markets pay more for lower quality 
hogs than do other markets. Many marketing specialists con­
tend that the interior or direct buying plants select, out of 
an area, the high yielding, high grading hogs. They do this 
by paying premium prices for the better hogs, thereby leaving 
the lower grade hogs to be marketed at the terminal markets. 
The terminal markets, because of this situation, are forced, 
if they are to receive any hogs, to pay higher than normal for 
the lower quality hogs. The terminals contend that direct 
buyers discount highly the poorer quality hogs. A further 
study of this problem could be accomplished by separating hogs 
into standard quality ranges and marketing the various grades 
to different markets. 
If price differences do exist between markets in Iowa, as 
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found in this study, then a continual study should be made 
ascertaining which market is paying the lower or higher prices 
to producers, 
A study should be made to determine how each Iowa hog 
market responds to price changes. All packing plants, ideally 
should have identical price response curves, that is, price 
responses should be identical if producers are informed of 
price responses and price differentials. The price deviations 
should not be larger than the cost of transporting hogs from 
one market to another. Clearly, the price differences found 
in this study were much larger than the transportation cost. 
Producers of Iowa market a majority of their hogs 
directly to packing plants. Studies should be made to de­
termine the buying practices used by direct buyers. Many 
buying practices presently being used by hog buying firms, 
as reported by producers, clearly are not to the advantage of 
the producer. These buying practices should be understood by 
the producer before he markets his hogs. 
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APPENDIX. A 
Definitions of Variables Used in Analyzing Marketing 
Periods Separately-
Dependent variable 
Xj = Market Weight Price 
(Total value of shipment - Marketing charge\ 
Market weight of hogs 
X5 through X-j^ o - dummy variables for blocks of shipments 
Xii = Difference between live sort markets and terminal 
markets (A = 1; C = -1) 
X12 = Difference between terminal markets and carcass 
grade and yield markets (A = -1; B = 1) 
X^  ^= Difference between the two terminal markets 
(Al = 1; Ag = -1) 
X14 = Difference between the two carcass grade and 
yield markets (B^  = 1; B^  = -1) 
1^5 ~ Difference between the two live sort markets 
(Cj!^  = 1; Cj = -1) 
X17 = A time trend variable between the terminal markets 
and the live sort markets 
Xig = A time trend variable between the terminal markets 
and the carcass grade and yield markets 
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Table 17. ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for 
first marketing period 
Source D.F, Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 12 5.7446 .4707 
Residual 9 ,0641 .oo7i 
Total 21 5.8087 
F ratio = 67.21 Multiple R^  = 0,9^ 9 
Standard error = 0.0844 
Table lô. Value of a, b values and standard errors of b 
for first marketing period 
a = $15.96 per hundred pounds of hog 
b subscript designation b value standard error of b 
6 0.79** 0.048 
7 0.09* 0.043 
Û 0.18» 0.043 
9 -0.05 0.043 
10 -0.12» 0.044 
11 -0.29»» 0.028 
12 0.50»» 0.029 
13 -0.05 0.037 
14 0.13»* 0.035 
15 -0.08» 0.031 
17 0.04»* 0.008 
18 0.02» 0.010 
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Table 19. ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for first 
marketing period 
Source D.F, Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 10 5.3263 0.5326 
Residual 11 0.4^ 24 0.0439 
Total 21 5.ÔOÔ7 
F ratio = 12.15 R^  = 0.917 
Standard error = 0.209 
Table 20. Value of a, b values and standard errors of b 
for first marketing period 
a = $15,98 per hundred pounds of hog 
b subscript designation b value Standard error of b 
6 0.82** 0.104 
7 0.04 0.103 
8 0.16 0.105 
9 -0.10 0.104 
10 -0.23 0.104 
11 -0.36** 0.067 
12 0.50** 0.071 
13 -0.07 0.090 
14 0.15 0.086 
15 -0.10 0.077 
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2 Table 21, ANOV, R , standard error and F ratio for second 
marketing period 
Source D.F. Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 12 7,0409 0,506? 
Residual 11 1.1086 0.1006 
Total 23 8.1496 
F ratio = R^  = 
Standard error = 
Table 22, Value of a, b values and standard errors of b 
for second marketing period 
a = $14.22 per hundred pounds of hog 
b subscript designation b value standard error of b 
6 -0.04 0.158 
7 0,25 0,154 
8 -0,01 0,155 
9 0,22 0,154 
10 -0,25 0.157 
11 0,09 0.095 
12 0.35** 0.095 
13 0,03 0.122 
14 0.08 0.122 
15 -0.61** 0.121 
17 -0.04 0.028 
18 0.02 0.029 
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Table 23. ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio for second 
marketing period 
Source D.F, Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 10 6,0745 0,6875 
Residual 13 1.2752 0.0981 
Total 23 8.1497 
F ratio = 7.00 R^  = 0.844 
Standard error = O.313 
Table 24. Value of a, b values and standard error of b for 
second marketing period 
a = $14,21 per hundred pounds of hog 
b subscript designation b value standard error of b 
6 -0,06 0.151 
7 -0,24 0.151 Ô 0.01 0.151 
9 0.23 0.151 
10 -0,22 0.151 
11 0,08 0.093 
12 0.36** 0.093 
13 <0,01 0.119 
14 0.07 0.119 
15 -0,62** 0.119 
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APPENDIX B 
Explanation of Variables Used in Analyzing Weight 
Loss to Market 
Dependent variable Xg = the market weight of hogs 
X^  - Xi^  = dummy variables for weeks, subscripts desig­
nate the following: X^  = first block shipped, 
X^  = second block shipped, •••, X^ /^  = twelfth 
block shipped. 
%15 
= same as X^ y in text page 79. 
%16 
= same as X^ g in text page 79. 
1^7 same as X^  ^in text page 79. 
= same as XgQ in text page 79. 
Xi9 
= same as X25 in text page 79. 
2^0 same as X2^  in text page ao. 
X21 
= 
2^0  ^^ 15 
2^2 X20 times Xjg 
2^3 X20 times X]_y 
2^4 
= X20 times X^ g 
2^5 X20 times X29 
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Table 25, ANOV, R^ , standard error and F ratio of market 
weight analysis 
Source D.F, Sum squares Mean square 
Regression 22 113, 312 ,920 5,150,580 
Residual 23 17, 912 ,240 778,790 
Total 45 131, 225 ,160 
F ratio = 6,61 Standard error = 882.49 
= 0.663 
Table 26. Value of a. b values, standard errors of b and 
T values for weight loss analysis 
a = 9032.3 pounds 
b subscriot b value standard error b 
4 221.6 1207.9 
5 598.9 1466.2 
6 88.8 817.0 
7 497.7 912.9 
a 1923.4 3652.8 
9 876.3 4309.4 
10 853.4 3215.4 
11 518.6 2484.8 
12 627.8 2873.2 
13 80.7 1152.5 
14 750.3 2790.2 
15 175,4 177.4 
16 184.1 97.3 
17 113.5 257.1 
18 173.6 251.4 
19 255.5 237.2 
20 1.6 1.9 
21 0.1 0.1 
22 0.2 0.1 
23 0.1 0.2 
24 0.2 0.2 
25 0.2 0.2 
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APPENDIX C 
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lâble 27, Data derived from marketing study 
. - — Other exnenses 
Ship­ Gross Com Inspeo. 
ment No. Initial Mkt. value and tion Meal 
No. Head wt. vt. shio Yardage bedding vard boar; 
8/26/63 
41 
lb. lb. Î à i i i 
Fort Dodge 1 8447 8300 1390.55 .2-
Sioux City 1 42 8800 8405 1398.63 14.28 6.30 .86 .2J 
Cedar Rapids 1 43 8962 8785 1493.45 .2! 
Qoaha 1 43 8796 8440 1433.50 17.20 4.75 .65 .21 
8/29/63 
Omaha 2 50 10198 9870 1609.46 20.00 2.85 8.20 .3^  
Waterloo 2 50 10052 9925 1646.13 .3: 
Des Moines 2 50 10114 9965 1639.17 .3: 
Cedar Rapids 2 50 9999 9795 1577.70 
Waterloo 3 47 9566 9680 1620,06 .3: 
Fort Dodge 3 48 9861 9820 1570.07 .3: 
Des Moines 3 47 9677 9755 1601.29 .3: 
sBM 
Des Moines 4 48 9777 9425 1536.45 .3: 
Sioux City k 48 9773 9315 1513.68 16.32 5.10 1.02 20.3: 
Fort Dodge 4 48 9844 9465 1471.10 .3: 
Cedar Rapids 4 48 9737 9340 1461.61 .3Î 
Cedar Rapids 5 55 11293 10770 1673.32 .3! 
Waterloo 5 55 11331 10860 1800.00 .3< 
Omaha 5 55 11242 10645 1730.94 22.00 5.70 .82 .34 
Fort Dodge 5 55 11247 10840 1663.89 .34 
9/16/6? 
Omaha 6 56 11578 11150 1744.97 22.40 8.40 .84 .3< 
Des Moines 6 56 11632 11235 1750.88 .3: 
r expenses 
m Inspec- Net 
nd tlon Meat Total Trucking return Composite MLtial Mkt. 
ding yard board Comm. other and Ins. TO-TC>=TS price wt. vt. 
! i I I Î 1 I àùk' Ém. 
.27 .27 9.75 1390.28 .15932 .16458 .16750 
30 .86 .28 18.55 40.27 39.92 1358.36 .15661 .15362 .16086 
.29 .29 54.40 1493.16 .15992 .16661 .16996 
75 .65 .28 18.52 41.41 42.38 1392.09 .15631 .15728 .16392 
85 8.20 .34 23.09 
.33 
.33 
54.48 50.48 1554.98 
.33 12.00 1645.80 
.33 22.92 1638.84 
33.29 1577.70 
.15475 .15140 .15643 
.15359 .16373 .16582 
.15440 .16204 .16445 
.15357 .15778 .16100 
.31 
.31 
.31 
..31 12.00 1619.75 .15258 .16935 .16732 
.31 9.75 1569.76 .15688 .16263 .15985 
.31 22.43 1600.98 .15409 .16544 .16411 
10 1.02 
.31 
20.32 
.32 
.32 
.31 
20.95 43.71 
.32 
.32 
21.67 1536.14 .15036 ..15711 .16298 
50.56 1469.97 .15010 .14952 .15687 
9.75 1470.78 .15225 .14940 .15539 
29.88 1461.29 .15165 .15007 .15645 
70 .82 
.39 66.34 .39 66.34 1672.93 
.36 .36 12.00 1799.64 
.36 23.20 52.08 5!*.66 1678.86 
.36 .36 9.75 1663.53 
.14921 .14814 .15533 
.15018 .15882 .16571 
.14941 .14826 .15656 
.14965 .14791 .15346 
40 .84 .38 23.59 55.61 33.80 1689.36 .14484 
.37 .37 25.84 1750.51 .14685 
.14494 .15051 
.15049 .15581 
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Table 27» Data derived from marketing study 
. Other excenses 
Ship. Gross Com Ins pec. 
ment No. Initial Mkt, value and tion Mea 
No. Head wt. «t. shin Yardage bedding yard boar 
8/26/63 
£b. i â i i i 
4l Fort Dodge 1 8447 8300 1390.55 .2 
Sioux City 1 42 8800 8405 1398.63 14.28 6.30 .86 .2 
Cedar Rapids 1 43 8962 8785 1493 A5 .2 
Qaaha 1 43 8796 8440 1433.50 17.20 4.75 .65 .2 
8/29/63 
9870 1609.46 Omaha 2 50 10198 20.00 2.85 8,20 .3  
Waterloo 2 50 10052 9925 1646.13 .3 
Des Moines 2 50 10114 9965 1639.17 .3  
Cedar Rapids 2 50 9999 9795 1577.70 
8/3/63 
Vfaterloo 3 47 9566 9680 1620,06 .3  
Fort Dodge 3 48 9861 9820 1570.07 .3  
Des Moines 3 47 9677 9755 1601.29 .3  
J/lf/63 
46 Des Moines 4 9777 9425 1536.45 .3  
Sioux City 48 9773 9315 1513.68 16.32 5.10 1.02 20.3 
Fort Dodge 4 48 9844 9465 1471.10 .3  
Cedar Rapids 4 48 9737 9340 1461.61 .3  
9/9/63 
Cedar Rapids 5 55 11293 10770 1673.32 .3  
Waterloo 5 55 11331 10860 1800.00 .3  
Ohaha 5 55 11242 10645 1730.94 22.00 5.70 .82 .3  
Fort Dodge 5 55 11247 10840 1663.89 .3  
9/16/63 
Oteaha 6 56 11578 11150 1744.97 22.40 8.40 .84 .3  
Des Moines 6 56 11632 11235 1750.88 .3  
er expenaes 
om Ins pec- Net 
and tion Meat Total Trucking return Composite MLtial Mkt. 
ddlng yard board Comm. other and ins. TGr-TO=TN price wt. vt. 
Î i I I Î I i 2^ 1 
.27 . 27 9.75 1390.28 .15932 .16458 .16750 
.30 .86 .28 18.55 40.27 39.92 1358.36 ,15661 .15362 .16086 
.29 .29 54.40 1493.16 .15992 ,16661 .16996 
.75 .65 .28 18.52 4l.4l 42.38 1392.09 .15631 .15728 .16392 
.85 8,20 .34 23.09 
.33 
.33 
.31 
.31 
.31 
.31 
.10 1.02 20.32 20.95 
.32 
.32 
.39 66.34 
.36 
.70 ,82 .36 23,20 
,36 
.40 ,84 .38 23.59 
.37 
54.48 50.48 1554.98 
.33 12.00 1645.80 
.33 22.92 1638,84 
33,29 1577.70 
,,31 12.00 1619.75 
.31 9.75 1569.76 
.31 22,43 1600.98 
,31 21,67 1536,14 
43.71 50,56 1469.97 
,32 9,75 1470,78 
,32 29.88 1461.29 
.39 66.34 1672.93 
.36 12.00 1799.64 
52.08 5f**66 1678.86 
.36 9.75 1663.53 
55.61 33.80 1689.36 
.37 25.84 1750.51 
,15475 .15140 .15643 
.15359 .16373 .16582 
.15440 .16204 .16445 
.15357 .15778 .16100 
.15258 .16935 .16732 
.15688 .16263 .15985 
.15409 .16544 .16411 
.15036 ..15711 .16298 
.15010 .14952 .15687 
.15225 .14940 .15539 
.15165 .15007 .15645 
.14921 .14814 .15533 
.15018 .15882 .16571 
.14941 .14826 .15656 
.14965 .14791 .15346 
.14484 .14494 .I5051 
.14685 .15049 .15581 
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Table 2?. (Continued) 
Other expenses 
Ship­ Gross Com Inspec 
ment No. Initial Mkt,  value and tion Meat 
No. Head wt. wt. shin Yardage bedding yard board 
2/27/64 
lb. lb. i â i â È 
.26 Otnaha 1 39 7680 7280 1099.28 15.60 5.28 .78 
Des Moines 1 39 7673 7420 1103.65 .26 
Cedar Rapids 1 39 7632 7320 1037.98 
3/2/^ 
8074 7615 Sioux City 2 40 1123.21 13.60 3.27 .81 .27 
Waterloo 2 40 8062 7760 1175.03 .26 
Des Moines 2 40 8068 7695 1138.64 .27 
Cedar Rapids 2 40 7987 7660 1110.70 .27 
3/5/64 
Sioux City 3 40 7848 7440 1116.41 13.60 6.40 .81 .27 
Omaha 3 40 7818 7395 1126.05 16.00 5.42 .80 .27 
Waterloo 3 40 7832 7475 1090.90 .26 
Fort Dodge 3 40 7829 7500 967.19 .26 
1268.05 18.00 Omaha 4 45 8800 8370 4.50 .90 .30 
Waterloo 4 45 8784 8455 1254.38 .30 
Des Moines 4 45 8752 8255 1238.82 .29 
Port Dodge 4 45 8768 8345 1096.80 .30 
3/12/64 •— 
Sioux City 5 40 7852 7510 1113.30 13.60 6.80 .81 .27 
Waterloo 5 40 7854 7650 1091.11 .26 
Cedar Falls 5 40 7876 7625 1105.62 .26 
Fort Dodge 5 40 7897 7660 1000.59 .26 
3/18/64 
54 10415 Sioux City 6 10783 1521.21 18.36 4.13 1.08 .36 
Anaha 6 5^  10700 10335 1472.73 21.60 6.30 1.58 .36 
Des Moines 6 54 10799 IO68O 1540.04 .36 
Cedar Rapids 6 54 10797 10659 1555.63 t36 
Totals 2115 63220.73 258.88 81.92 20.98 13.45 
; 
other expenses 
Com 
and 
bedding 
Inspec. 
tion 
yard 
Meat 
board Comm. 
Total 
other 
Net 
Trucking return 
and ins. TG-TO=TN 
Composite Initial 
price wt. 
Mkt. 
wt. 
i i i i i i i iZib. iZlb. 
5.28 .78 .26 
.26 
17.74 39.66 
.26 
41.34 
17.06 
23.42 
1059.62 
1103.39 
1037.98 
.13496 
.13478 
.13441 
.13685 
.14386 
.13600 
.14437 
.14877 
.14180 
3.27 .81 .27 
.26 
.27 
.27 
17.75 35.70 
.26 
.27 
.27 
37.66 
12.00 
17.69 
38.30 
1087.51 
1174.97 
1138.37 
1110.43 
.13544 
.13595 
.13508 
.13468 
.13380 
.14574 
.14116 
.13902 
.14375 
.15141 
.14800 
.14496 
6.40 
5.42 
.81 
.80 
.27 
.27 
.26 
.26 
17.75 
18.15 
38.83 
40.64 
.26 
.26 
44.40 
42.07 
12.00 
9.75 
1077.58 
1085.41 
1090.64 
966.97 
.13253 
.13189 
.13243 
.13256 
.13638 
.13770 
.13925 
.12351 
.14386 
.14558 
.14590 
.12893 
4.50 .90 .30 
.30 
.29 
.30 
20.20 43.90 
.30 
.29 
.30 
46.66 
12.00 
19.38 
9.75 
1224.15 
1254.08 
1238.53 
1096.50 
.13005 
.13371 
.13224 
.13341 
.13808 
.14276 
.14151 
.12505 
.14517 
.14832 
.15003 
.13139 
6.80 .81 .27 
.26 
.26 
.26 
17.75 39.23 
.26 
.26 
.26 
44.75 
30.50 
9.75 
1074.07 
1090.85 
1105.36 
1000.33 
.13415 
.13333 
.13276 
.13319 
.13587 
.13986 
.13647 
.12667 
.14205 
.14259 
.14096 
.13059 
4.13 
6.30 
1.08 
1.58 
.36 
.36 
.36 
23.84 
23.89 
47.77 
53.73 
.36 
61.80 
58.39 
24.56 
42.98 
1473.44 
1419.12 
1539.68 
:i$9i27 
.13315 
.13189 
.13224 
.13267 
.13574 
.13151 
.14257 
.14404 
.14054 
.13615 
.14416 
.14597 
Î1.92 20.98 13.45 305.92 681.15 1336.35 62539.94 
